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Abstract—An increasing number of mobile applications (abbrev. apps), like Pokemon Go and Snapchat, reward the users who
physically visit some locations tagged as POIs (places-of-interest) by the apps. We study the novel POI-based collaboration between
apps and venues (e.g., restaurants). On the one hand, an app charges a venue and tags the venue as a POI. The POI tag motivates
users to visit the venue, which potentially increases the venue’s sales. On the other hand, the venue can invest in the app-related
infrastructure, which enables more users to use the app and further benefits the app’s business. The apps’ existing POI tariffs cannot
fully incentivize the venue’s infrastructure investment, and hence cannot lead to the most effective app-venue collaboration. We design
an optimal two-part tariff, which charges the venue for becoming a POI, and subsidizes the venue every time a user interacts with the
POI. The subsidy design efficiently incentivizes the venue’s infrastructure investment, and we prove that our tariff achieves the highest
app’s revenue among a general class of tariffs. Furthermore, we derive some counter-intuitive guidelines for the POI-based
collaboration. For example, a bandwidth-consuming app should collaborate with a low-quality venue (users have low utilities when
consuming the venue’s products).
Index Terms—Network economics, Stackelberg game, business model.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivations
Many popular mobile applications (abbrev. apps), especially
the augmented reality apps [1], integrate users’ digital expe-
rience with the real world. For example, Pokemon Go, one
of the most popular mobile games in 2016, tags some real-
world locations as “PokeStops” or “Gyms”. When visiting
these locations physically, users can collect game items or
participate in “battles” in the game [2]. Snapchat, a pop-
ular image messaging app, provides various image filters,
including “Geofilters”, which are unlocked only when users
visit the specified real-world locations [3]. Many other apps,
such as Ingress [4], Snatch [5], and Jurassic World Alive
[6], apply similar approaches to integrate users’ digital
experience and physical activities. We use POIs (places-of-
interest) to refer to the real-world locations where users can
obtain rewards or unlock some features of the apps.
When the locations are venues such as restaurants and
cafes, the POI tags have the potential to benefit both the
apps and the venues. On the one hand, the venues’ in-
• H. Yu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Northwestern University, USA. E-mail: haoran.yu@northwestern.edu. G.
Iosifidis is with the School of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity
College Dublin, Ireland. E-mail: iosifidg@tcd.ie. B. Shou is with the De-
partment of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong. E-mail: biying.shou@cityu.edu.hk. J. Huang is with the Department
of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong, and the School of Science and Engineering, The Chinese University
of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. E-mail: jwhuang@ie.cuhk.edu.hk.
• The work of G. Iosifidis is supported by a Research Grant from the
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) under Grant 17/CDA/4760. The work
of B. Shou is supported by the Hong Kong RGC General Research Fund
(CityU 11527316). The work of J. Huang is supported by the General
Research Funds (Project Number CUHK 14219016) established under the
University Grant Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, China.
frastructure (e.g., smartphone chargers and Wi-Fi networks)
enhances the users’ experience of using the apps, and hence
benefits the apps’ businesses. For example, many apps (es-
pecially the augmented reality apps like Pokemon Go [7])
drain the smartphones’ batteries quickly, and some apps
are data-hungry (e.g., Jurassic World Alive consumes more
than 100MB per day for a regular player). The smartphone
chargers and Wi-Fi networks at the venues alleviate users’
needs of reducing the app usage because of battery or data
usage concern. On the other hand, the POI tags significantly
increase the number of the venues’ visitors, who might
purchase the venues’ products and increase the venues’
sales. This explains the increasingly popular collaboration
between apps (online businesses) and venues (offline busi-
nesses). In 2016, Pokemon Go collaborated with Sprint and
McDonald’s, tagging 10,500 Sprint stores in the U.S. and
3,000 McDonald’s restaurants in Japan as POIs [2], [8]. In
particular, Sprint stores offered Pokemon Go players free
smartphone charging stations [8]. It was estimated that each
of the McDonald’s restaurants that became POIs attracted
up to 2,000 game players per day [2], and the POI tags
increased some stores’ sales by 100% [9]. In 2017, Wendy’s
(a restaurant chain) made its “Geofilters” in Snapchat,
which drove 42,000 additional visitors within a week [3].
Yinyangshi tagged over 5,000 KFC restaurants in China as
POIs [10], and similarly Snatch partnered with Mitchells &
Butlers pubs in the U.K. [5]. In 2018, Jurassic World Alive
established the POI-based collaboration with Walmart and
AMC Theaters [6]. Some augmented reality apps that will
be released soon may plan for a similar partnership with
venues [11].
All the aforementioned apps have augmented reality
features. It was estimated that the augmented reality and
virtual reality market’s worldwide revenue will be nearly
$215 billion in 2021 [12]. Hence, the POI-based collabora-
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Fig. 1: An example of POI-based collaboration (all users use the app).
tions can potentially create substantial revenues for the apps
and venues. However, as we show in the following, the apps
and venues do not have fully aligned interests in attracting
the users, which makes it difficult for the apps and venues
to completely realize the collaborations’ potential.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate the POI-based collaboration. As
shown in the abovementioned examples, an app usually
collaborates with a store/restaurant chain (e.g., Sprint, Mc-
Donald’s, and KFC). In order to avoid internal competition,
the venues in a chain are typically strategically spaced
out. Therefore, we approximate the collaboration between
the app and the chain by the collaboration between the
app and a representative venue of the chain. In Fig. 1,
when the venue is not a POI, only the nearby users with
interests in the venue’s products (e.g., user 1) visit the
venue. After the venue pays the app and becomes a POI,
more users (including those without interests in the venue’s
products) visit the venue to interact with the POI (e.g.,
participate in the “battles” held at the POI). The number
of these visitors depends on the venue’s investment in the
app-related infrastructure. Moreover, the app can display
location-dependent in-app advertisements to these visitors
to get additional advertising revenue (for an app that does
not show any in-app advertisement, the corresponding ad-
vertising revenue is 0 in our model). As Fig. 1 shows, the
app and venue do not have fully aligned interests in terms
of attracting the users. The app delivers the advertisements
to all users interacting with the POI (e.g., users 1 ∼ 3), and
hence benefits from a high investment in the app-related
infrastructure. The venue only gains profits from the users
with interests in its products (e.g., users 1 and 2), and may
not choose a high investment level. A low investment level
will reduce the number of users interacting with the POI.
The key challenge is to design the app’s optimal tariff
scheme (which charges the venue for becoming a POI)
to incentivize the venue’s investment in the app-related
infrastructure. The tariff schemes commonly used by the
apps include the per-player-only tariff and lump-sum-only
tariff. In the per-player-only tariff scheme, the apps charge
a venue according to the number of users playing the apps
at the venue. For example, Pokemon Go charges a venue
up to $0.50 per game player [2]. In the lump-sum-only tariff
scheme, the apps (e.g., Snapchat) charge a venue a lump-
sum fee, which is independent of the number of players at
the venue. We will show that these existing tariff schemes
are not able to fully incentivize the venues’ investments
and achieve desirable users’ experience. This motivates us
to design a tariff scheme that induces high infrastructure
investments at the venues and increases the number of users
interacting with the POIs.
1.2 Surveys
To have a complete picture of the problem, we need to
understand the POI-based collaboration’s impact from the
users’ perspective. There are several existing market surveys
(such as [13] and [14]) about Pokemon Go players’ engage-
ments with the venues like restaurants, cafes, and bars. For
example, in SLANT’s survey, 71% of the 500 respondents
had visited these venues because of the POI features, and
51% of the respondents had visited at least one venue for the
first time because of Pokemon Go [13]. These data reveal the
venues’ potential benefits from becoming POIs.
Because there is no prior survey about the dependence of
users’ experience on the POIs’ infrastructure, we conducted
a new survey involving 103 Pokemon Go players in North
America, Europe, and Asia. 81% of the surveyed players
stated that the infrastructure, including Wi-Fi networks,
smartphone chargers, and air conditioners, could enhance
their game experience. This data reveals that the app-related
infrastructure at the POIs is important for the players.
Our survey also reveals the existence of both the network
effect and congestion effect among the players. The network
effect means that when many players interact with the POI,
each player’s experience might improve, as the players can
share the app’s information and play the app together. The
congestion effect arises when the players compete for the lim-
ited infrastructure at the POI (e.g., Wi-Fi network), and this
might deteriorate each player’s experience. In our survey,
64% of the players stated that their game experience could
be improved if there are nearby players playing the game
(i.e., network effect), and 59% of the players thought that the
Wi-Fi speeds at the POIs affected their game experience (i.e.,
congestion effect). More details of the survey can be found in
Section A of the supplemental material.
1.3 Our Contributions
In this work, we build a detailed model to capture and
analyze the strategic interactions among an app, a venue,
and users. Inspired by the two common tariffs in the market
(i.e., lump-sum-only tariff and per-player-only tariff), we
design a two-part tariff, under which the app charges the
venue based on a lump-sum fee and a per-player charge. We
will show that the two-part tariff enjoys the advantages of
both the lump-sum-only tariff and the per-player-only tariff.
The two-part tariff has been applied to many commercial
practices. For example, an amusement park may charge
an admission fee and also a price for each ride that a
user takes in the park. A shopping club can charge an
annual membership fee and meanwhile charge for each of a
customer’s actual purchases.
Considering the inherent leader-follower relations
among the app, venue, and users, we model the problem
by a three-stage Stackelberg game: in Stage I, the app
announces the two-part tariff; in Stage II, the venue decides
whether to become a POI and how much to invest in the
infrastructure; in Stage III, the users decide whether to visit
the venue and whether to interact with the POI. The game’s
3analysis is very interesting and challenging because of the
coexistence of the network effect and congestion effect.
Our first main result is the design of a charge-with-subsidy
tariff scheme, which achieves the highest app’s revenue
among a general class of tariff schemes (i.e., those charge
the venue according to the venue’s choices, the fraction of
users consuming the offline products, and the fraction of
users interacting with the POI). Specifically, we show that
the app’s optimal two-part tariff includes a positive lump-
sum fee and a negative per-player charge, which implies that
the app should first charge the venue for becoming a POI,
and then subsidize the venue every time a user interacts with
the POI. Furthermore, the amount of the per-player subsidy
should equal the app’s unit advertising revenue, which is
the app’s revenue from showing the advertisements to one
user. We also study its implementation in the case where
the app does not know the unit advertising revenue when
it announces the tariff, and prove that a risk-averse app
should choose a smaller lump-sum fee and a larger per-
player charge (i.e., a smaller per-player subsidy).
Our second main result is the provision of counter-
intuitive guidelines for the app regarding the type of venues
to collaborate with. We analytically study the influences
of the app’s features (such as the congestion effect factor,
network effect factor, and unit advertising revenue) and
venue’s characteristics (such as the venue’s quality, venue’s
popularity, and population size) on the app’s revenue, and
obtain several important results. First, when the app’s con-
gestion effect factor is large,1 the app should collaborate
with a low-quality venue, whose offline products induce
low utilities to the users. Second, when the unit advertising
revenue is small, the app may avoid collaborating with a
popular venue (whose products are liked by a large fraction
of users) or a venue in a busy area (where the number
of users is large). One key reason behind these counter-
intuitive results is that if a venue is high-quality, popular,
or in a busy area, it already attracts many visitors before
becoming a POI. After it becomes a POI, the initial visitors
induce large congestion to the new visitors in terms of
playing the app. This potentially decreases the number of
new visitors, and further reduces the venue’s willingness to
become a POI. We analytically derive the conditions under
which this negative impact dominates. In this case, the app
should avoid collaborating with a venue which is high-
quality, popular, or in a busy area.
We summarize our major contributions as follows:
• Analytical Study of POI-Based Collaboration between
Online Apps and Offline Venues: Motivated by our
survey, we model the interactions among the app,
venue, and users as a three-stage game, and char-
acterize their equilibrium strategies. The analysis is
particularly challenging because of the coexistence
of network effect and congestion effect.
• Design of Optimal Two-Part Tariff : We design the
optimal two-part tariff for the app and show the
charge-with-subsidy structure. We also consider the
tariff design under the uncertainty about the unit
1. For example, a bandwidth-consuming app has a large congestion
effect factor, since the users will easily experience the network conges-
tion if they use the app in a low-speed Wi-Fi network.
advertising revenue, which makes our tariff scheme
robust for implementation.
• Analysis of Parameters’ Influences: We provide counter-
intuitive guidelines for the collaboration via study-
ing the influences of the app’s and venue’s charac-
teristics on the app’s revenue. For example, we show
that a bandwidth-consuming app should collaborate
with a low-quality venue.
• Comparison with State-of-the-Art Schemes: We analyti-
cally prove that our two-part tariff achieves the high-
est app’s revenue among a general class of schemes.
We also numerically show our scheme’s performance
improvement over the current market practices (i.e.,
lump-sum-only tariff and per-player-only tariff).
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Cooperation of Online and Offline Businesses
There are few references studying the cooperation between
online and offline businesses. Berger et al. in [15] investi-
gated the cooperative advertising between a manufacturer
who has an online channel and a retailer who has an offline
channel. Yu et al. in [16] studied a situation where the online
advertisers sponsor the venues’ public Wi-Fi services, and
deliver mobile advertisements to the venues’ visitors. Our
work is closely related to [17] and [18], which conducted
empirical studies of Pokemon Go’s impact on the offline
businesses. Pamuru et al. in [17] collected consumers’ re-
views of 2,032 restaurants in Houston, and analyzed the
correlation between the reviews and whether the restaurants
are covered by the POIs (“PokeStops”). Colley et al. in [18]
surveyed 375 Pokemon Go players, and showed that 46%
of the players had purchased the venues’ offline products
because of the POIs. Different from [17] and [18], our work
surveys the impact of the venues’ infrastructure on Poke-
mon Go players’ game experience, and provides the first
model and analysis for the cooperation between online apps
and offline businesses.
2.2 Two-Part Tariffs
Since the studies in [19] and [20], there have been many ref-
erences analyzing the two-part tariffs and their applications.
For example, references [21] and [22] analyzed the two-
part tariff contracts for the manufacturers or suppliers to
coordinate the channels. References [23] and [24] designed
the two-part tariffs (or three-part tariffs, which additionally
consider free units of service) for the service providers to
extract the consumer surplus. We consider a two-part tariff
scheme, because it can induce the buyer’s efficient decision
(e.g., welfare-maximizing decision). This is particularly use-
ful in the POI-based collaboration, where the app (seller)
induces the venue’s (buyer’s) efficient investment. Our two-
part tariff design is different from those in [19]– [24]. First,
the schemes proposed in [19]– [24] include positive per-
unit charges, while our optimal two-part tariff includes a
negative per-player charge. This is because the investment
cost is paid by the venue rather than the app, and the app
needs to subsidize the venue’s investment via a negative
per-player charge. Second, we consider both the network
effect and the congestion effect among the users, which
4significantly complicates the optimal design of the lump-
sum fee. The optimal lump-sum fee’s complicated depen-
dence on the system parameters leads to some counter-
intuitive guidelines for the POI-based collaboration (e.g., a
bandwidth-consuming app should collaborate with a low-
quality venue).
2.3 Congestion Effect and Network Effect
Some prior studies analyzed mobile services by jointly
considering the congestion effect and network effect among
users [25], [26], [27], [28]. For example, Zhang et al. in
[25] studied mobile caching users, who pre-cache contents
and disseminate the contents to users requesting them. The
authors considered the delay caused by serving a large
number of content requests and also the social connection
among the users. Gong et al. in [26] analyzed a wireless
provider’s data pricing by jointly considering the congestion
effect in the physical wireless domain and the social relation
among users. In these studies, the congestion levels are
determined by the congestion effect factors and users’ de-
mand, and service providers cannot alleviate the congestion
by investing in the service-related infrastructure. In contrast,
our work focuses on studying the venue’s investment in the
app-related infrastructure and how the app incentivizes the
venue to invest, which is the contribution of our work.
3 MODEL
As explained above, an app usually collaborates with a
store/restaurant chain (e.g., Sprint, McDonald’s, and KFC).
Because the venues in a chain are typically strategically
spaced out to avoid internal competitions, we focus on the
interaction between an app and a chain’s representative
venue. Our study serves as a first step towards understand-
ing the more general scenario where an app interacts with
multiple venues of different owners in the same area. We
will briefly discuss the challenges of analyzing this scenario
in Section 8.
In the following, we introduce the strategies of the app,
the representative venue, and the users, and formulate their
interactions as a three-stage game.
3.1 App’s Two-Part Tariff
Since most popular apps (e.g., Pokemon Go, Snapchat, and
Snatch) are free to users, we consider an app that does not
charge the users. In our model, the app only decides the
two-part tariff. When the venue becomes a POI, its payment
to the app contains: (i) the lump-sum fee l ∈ R, and (ii) the
product between the per-player charge p ∈ R and the num-
ber of users interacting with the POI. Note that both l and p
can be negative, in which case the venue receives a payment
from the app. The app’s revenue has two components: (i)
the venue’s payment, and (ii) the advertising revenue from
the in-app advertisements.
3.2 Venue’s POI and Investment Choices
We use r ∈ {0, 1} to denote the venue’s choice to become
a POI (r = 1) or not (r = 0). Moreover, we use I ≥ 0 to
denote the venue’s investment level on the app-related in-
frastructure, e.g., smartphone chargers and Wi-Fi networks.
Note that cellular technologies (e.g., LTE technology) suffer
from building penetration loss and may have poor indoor
performance [29]. Hence, it is necessary for the venue to
offer high-quality Wi-Fi service, which guarantees users’
wireless connection and enhances users’ game experience.
Some app-related infrastructure might be initially available
at the venue. Let parameter I0 ≥ 0 denote the initial invest-
ment level. Accordingly, I0 + I is the total investment level.
3.3 Users’ Types, Decisions, and Payoffs
We consider a continuum of users who use the app and seek
to interact with a POI. We denote the mass of users byN . We
assume that the number of users using the app is relatively
small, compared with the number of users who do not use
the app. In this case, the users who do not use the app are
not affected by whether the venue is a POI, and they are not
considered in our model.
3.3.1 User Type
Each user is characterized by attributes ω and c. The first
attribute ω ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the user has an
intrinsic interest in consuming the venue’s offline products.
We assume that ηN users have ω = 1 (will consume the of-
fline products when visiting the venue), and the remaining
(1− η)N users have ω = 0. Hence, parameter η ∈ [0, 1]
represents the venue’s popularity. The second attribute c
denotes the user’s transportation cost for visiting the venue,
and we assume that c is uniformly distributed in [0, cmax]
[30], [31], [32]. The app, venue, and users only know the
value of η and the uniform distribution of c, and do not
know the actual attributes of each user.
3.3.2 User Decision and Payoff
We denote a user’s decision by d, which has three possible
values: d = 0 (do not visit the venue), d = 1 (visit the
venue but do not interact with the POI), and d = 2 (visit
the venue and interact with the POI). Before computing a
user’s payoffs under different decisions d, we introduce the
following notations:
• Parameter U > 0 denotes the utility of a user with
ω = 1 when it consumes the offline products;
• Parameter V > 0 denotes a user’s base utility (with-
out considering the network effect and congestion
effect) of interacting with the POI;
• Parameters θ ≥ 0 and δ > 0 denote the network effect
factor and congestion effect factor, respectively;
• Function y¯ (r, I) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of users
choosing d = 2 (i.e., interacting with the POI), given
the venue’s choices r and I . The y¯ (r, I) depends
on all users’ equilibrium decisions, and will be com-
puted in Section 4.1.
A type-(ω, c) user’s payoff under the venue’s choices r
and I is
Πuser (ω, c, d, r, I) =
0, if d = 0,
Uω − c, if d = 1,
Uω − c+ V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N, if d = 2.
(1)
5When d = 0, the user’s payoff is 0.2 When d = 1,
the user’s payoff is the difference between Uω and the
transportation cost c. Recall that the user consumes the
offline products during its visit if and only if ω = 1 (i.e.,
it has an intrinsic interest in the venue’s products).
Compared with d = 1, the user’s payoff under d = 2 is
additionally affected by the base utility of interacting with
the POI (i.e., parameter V ), network effect, and congestion
effect. Specifically, the term θy¯ (r, I)N corresponds to the
network effect, which increases with the number of users
interacting with the POI [31], [32], [33]. Moreover, the term
−δy¯ (r, I)N/ (I + I0) corresponds to the congestion effect
of sharing the app-related infrastructure. The congestion
level δy¯ (r, I)N/ (I + I0) increases with the number of users
interacting with the POI,3 and decreases with the total
investment level I + I0.4 As we can see in Section 4.1, when
I + I0 approximates 0, we have y¯ (r, I) = 0. This implies
that no user will interact with the POI at the equilibrium
when there is no app-related infrastructure (e.g., no wireless
network).
3.3.3 Fractions x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I)
We use function x¯ (r, I) ∈ [0, 1] to denote the fraction of
users that have ω = 1 and visit the venue (i.e., choose
d = 1 or 2) under the venue’s choices r and I , and we will
compute x¯ (r, I) in Section 4.1. Function x¯ (r, I) corresponds
to the fraction of users consuming the venue’s offline prod-
ucts, hence the venue wants to increase x¯ (r, I). Recall that
y¯ (r, I) is the fraction of users interacting with the POI (i.e.,
choosing d = 2) at the equilibrium, hence the app wants to
increase y¯ (r, I). The difference between x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I)
reveals that the venue and app have overlapping but not
fully aligned interests in attracting the users.
3.4 Three-Stage Stackelberg Game
We formulate the interactions among the app, venue, and
users by a three-stage Stackelberg game, as illustrated in Fig.
2. Since the app has the market power and decides whether
to tag the venue as a POI, we assume that the app is the
leader and first-mover in the game. In Section 4.3.4, we will
discuss the case where the app and the venue negotiate the
two-part tariff via bargaining.
We assume that the users’ maximum transportation cost
cmax is large so that cmax > U + V + θN . This captures
a general case where some users are located far from the
venue and will not visit it even if it becomes a POI. Refer-
ences [31] and [32] considered similar cases, i.e., the range
2. Even if the users do not interact with the POI (i.e., d = 0 or 1),
they might still use the app. However, in this case, the app’s usage
will be much smaller than that when the users interact with the POI.
Furthermore, the users who do not interact with the POI might use the
app at different locations. Therefore, we do not consider the congestion
effect and network effect among these users. Without loss of generality,
we normalize these users’ utilities of using the app to 0 in (1).
3. In our future work, we can study the case where the users who do
not interact with the POI also use the venue’s infrastructure (e.g., Wi-Fi
networks) and cause congestion. We provide some detailed discussions
in Section V.1 of our supplemental material.
4. References [34] and [35] used similar investment models, which
capture the fact that the marginal reduction in the congestion level
decreases with the investment. References [36] and [37] also considered
similar linear congestion costs.
Stage I
The app announces (l, p) ∈ R× R.
⇓
Stage II
The venue chooses r ∈ {0, 1} and I ≥ 0.
⇓
Stage III
Each type-(ω, c) user decides d ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Fig. 2: Three-Stage Game.
of users’ transportation costs is large so that a firm cannot
attract all users in the market. We summarize our paper’s
key notations in Section B of our supplemental material.
4 THREE-STAGE GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the three-stage game by back-
ward induction. Because of page limit, we leave all detailed
proofs in our supplemental material.
4.1 Stage III: Users’ Decisions
Given the app’s tariff (l, p) in Stage I and the venue’s choices
of r and I in Stage II, each type-(ω, c) user solves the
following problem in Stage III.
Problem 1. A type-(ω, c) user decides d∗ by solving
max Πuser (ω, c, d, r, I) (2)
var. d ∈
{ {0, 1} , if r = 0,
{0, 1, 2} , if r = 1, (3)
where the payoff function Πuser (ω, c, d, r, I) is given in (1).
Here, (3) implies that the user can interact with the POI if
and only if the venue is a POI. Based on the venue’s choices
of r and I (i.e., whether the venue becomes a POI and how
much to invest), we show the users’ optimal decisions in the
following three cases and illustrate them in Fig. 3.
4.1.1 Case A: No POI
In Proposition 1, we will show that when the venue is not
a POI, only the users with intrinsic interests in the offline
products (i.e., ω = 1) and small transportation costs (i.e., c <
U ) will visit the venue. We also derive x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I) in
this case.
Proposition 1. When r = 0, the unique equilibrium at Stage III
is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =
{
1, if c ∈ [0, Uω) ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω, cmax] , (4)
where ω ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ [0, cmax].5 Moreover, x¯ (r, I) =
ηU/cmax and y¯ (r, I) = 0.
5. At the equilibrium, the user whose ω and c satisfy c = Uω has the
same payoff under choices d = 0 and d = 1. This user’s decision does
not affect the computation of x¯ (r, I) (and the analysis of Stages II and
I), because c follows a continuous distribution and the probability for a
user to have c = Uω is zero. Without affecting the analysis, we assume
that such a user always chooses d = 0 to simplify the presentation.
Similar assumptions are made in Propositions 2 and 3.
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Fig. 3: Users’ equilibrium decisions in Stage III. We use three colors
to indicate the equilibrium decisions of the users with different ω and
c. In Case B, users have infinitely many equilibria, with one example
illustrated here.
4.1.2 Case B: POI with Insufficient Total Investment
In Proposition 2, we will show that even after becoming a
POI, the venue cannot attract new visitors (compared with
Case A) if its total investment I + I0 ≤ δθ+V cmaxηUN . We define
Ith , δθ+V cmaxηUN
as the threshold investment level. Moreover,
we say the total investment is insufficient if I+ I0 ≤ Ith, and
it is sufficient otherwise.
Proposition 2. When r = 1 and I + I0 ≤ Ith, the unique form
of equilibrium at Stage III is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =

2, if c ∈ Cˆ and ω = 1,
1, if c ∈ [0, Uω) \ Cˆ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω, cmax] ,
(5)
where ω ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ [0, cmax], and Cˆ ⊆ [0, U) can be any
set that satisfies η
∫ U
0
1
cmax
1{c∈Cˆ}dc = V( δ
I+I0
−θ
)
N
.6 Moreover,
x¯ (r, I) = η Ucmax and y¯ (r, I) =
V(
δ
I+I0
−θ
)
N
.
In Case B, the app-related infrastructure simply enables
some of the initial visitors (i.e., the visitors to the venue
when the venue is not a POI) to interact with the POI. We
use Cˆ to denote the set of these visitors’ transportation costs
in (5). There are infinitely many Cˆ satisfying Proposition
2, and hence the users have infinitely many equilibria in
Case B. Proposition 2 shows that all the equilibria lead to
the same x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I), so the existence of infinitely
many equilibria does not affect the analysis of Stages II
and I. Note that Cˆ need not be an interval. This is because
each initial visitor has the incentive to interact with the POI
until the fraction of visitors interacting with the POI reaches
V(
δ
I+I0
−θ
)
N
. We show one example of Cˆ in Fig. 3, where the
set of transportation costs of the initial visitors who interact
with the POI consists of three intervals (i.e., the purple
intervals). The total “length” of these purple intervals is
V cmax(
δ
I+I0
−θ
)
ηN
, which is no greater than U in Case B.
4.1.3 Case C: POI with Sufficient Total Investment
In Proposition 3, we will show that after becoming a POI,
the venue can attract new visitors (compared with Case A)
if its total investment is sufficient. As we can see in Fig. 3,
6. Here, 1{·} is the indicator function, which equals 1 if the event in
the braces is true, and equals 0 otherwise.
the new visitors include users without intrinsic interests in
the offline products (i.e., ω = 0).
Proposition 3. When r = 1 and I + I0 > Ith, the unique
equilibrium at Stage III is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =
{
2, if c ∈ [0, Uω + ct) ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω + ct, cmax] , (6)
where ω ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ [0, cmax], and ct ,
V cmax(I+I0)−ηUNδ+ηUNθ(I+I0)
cmax(I+I0)+Nδ−Nθ(I+I0) . Moreover, x¯ (r, I) = η
U+ct
cmax
and y¯ (r, I) = ηU+ctcmax .
4.2 Stage II: Venue’s POI and Investment Choices
In Stage II, the venue solves the following problem by re-
sponding to the app’s tariff (l, p) in Stage I and anticipating
the users’ decisions d∗ (ω, c, r, I) in Stage III.
Problem 2. The venue makes the POI choice r∗ and investment
choice I∗ by solving
max Πvenue (r, I, l, p) , bNx¯ (r, I)− kI − r (l + pNy¯ (r, I))
(7)
var. r ∈ {0, 1} , I ≥ 0. (8)
Here, b > 0 is the venue’s profit due to one user’s consumption of
the offline products, and k > 0 denotes the unit investment cost.
In (7), Πvenue (r, I, l, p) is the venue’s payoff. The term
bNx¯ (r, I) is the venue’s aggregate profit due to its offline
products’ sales, the term kI is the investment cost [34],
and the term r (l + pNy¯ (r, I)) is the payment to the app
under the two-part tariff. Recall that x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I) are
the fractions of users consuming the offline products and
interacting with the POI, respectively, and they are given
in Propositions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 4.1. The fact that
x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I) have different and possibly complicated
expressions under different values of r and I makes the
analysis of Problem 2 quite challenging.
Next, we analyze three situations with different I0 and
δ, and derive the venue’s corresponding optimal choices.
4.2.1 Situation I: Small Initial Investment and Large Con-
gestion Effect
In Proposition 4, we will show that when the initial invest-
ment I0 ≤ Ith and the congestion effect factor δ > δth ,
(V cmax+θηUN)(bη(V cmax+θηUN)−θI0cmaxk)
kcmaxηU(cmax−θN) , the venue’s chosen
investment level I∗ (l, p) may be positive and meanwhile
lead to an insufficient total investment (i.e., I∗ (l, p) + I0 ≤
Ith). We call δth as the threshold congestion effect factor. We
illustrate Proposition 4 in Fig. 4 (the illustrations of Proposi-
tions 5 and 6 are provided in Section H of the supplemental
material).
Proposition 4. When I0 ≤ Ith and δ > δth, the venue’s optimal
choices are
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p))=
(0, 0) , if l>H1(p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H1(p), p<p1,
(1, Ith − I0) , if l≤H1(p), p1≤p≤p0,
(1, 0) , if l≤H1(p), p>p0,
(11)
7H1 (p) ,

− Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if p < p1,
−pNη Ucmax − kIth + kI0, if p1 ≤ p ≤ p0,
− Vδ
I0
−θp, if p > p0.
(9)
H2 (p) ,
 − Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if p < p2,
− Vδ
I0
−θp, if p ≥ p2.
(10)
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Fig. 4: Situation I of Venue’s POI Decision r∗ and Investment I∗ in
Stage II.
where p0 , −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN < 0, p1 , bη −
δk(V+ηU)c2max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 ,
and function H1 (p) defined in (9) are used to describe different
conditions of the app’s tariff (l, p) (in Fig. 4, we can divide the
(p, l)-plane into four regions based on p0, p1, and H1 (p)).
First, we see that the venue will become a POI (i.e.,
r∗ (l, p) = 1) if and only if l and p satisfy l ≤ H1 (p) (i.e., the
orange, blue, and purple parts in Fig. 4). This implies that
H1 (p) reflects the maximum lump-sum fee under which
the venue will be a POI in Situation I, given the per-player
charge p. We can show that H1 (p) is convexly decreasing in
p. Intuitively, when the app increases p, it has to reduce l to
ensure that the venue becomes a POI.
Second, we discuss the venue’s investment I∗ (l, p).
When l > H1 (p), the venue does not become a POI, and
hence chooses I∗ (l, p) = 0. When l ≤ H1 (p), I∗ (l, p)
is independent of l, and is decreasing in p. Specifically,
I∗ (l, p) has three different expressions based on the value
of p: (a) when p < p1, the venue chooses I∗ (l, p) =
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 > Ith − I0; (b)
when p1 ≤ p ≤ p0 (we can prove that p1 < p0 in
Situation I), the venue chooses I∗ (l, p) = Ith − I0. Since
I∗ (l, p) + I0 ≤ Ith, the total investment is insufficient, and
cannot attract new visitors to the venue. The reason the
venue still chooses a positive investment level in this case
is that the per-player charge p is negative (i.e., p ≤ p0 < 0).
Hence, the app actually incentivizes the venue to invest by
charging a negative p (i.e., providing a subsidy); (c) when
p > p0, the per-player charge is large, and the venue does
not invest.
4.2.2 Situation II: Small Initial Investment and Small Con-
gestion Effect
We will show that when I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, if the venue’s
chosen investment level I∗ (l, p) is positive, it will always
lead to a sufficient total investment (i.e., I∗ (l, p) + I0 >
Ith) and hence attract new visitors. This is different from
Situation I, because the congestion effect factor δ in Situation
II is smaller than that in Situation I, which makes it easier
for the venue to attract new visitors.
We first use Lemma 1 to introduce p2 (which will be
used to describe different conditions of the app’s tariff (l, p)
in Proposition 5), and then show Proposition 5.
Lemma 1. When I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth,
there is a unique p ∈ [p0, p1] that satisfies
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − Ncmax bη2U +
kI0 +
V
δ
I0
−θp = 0, and we denote it by p2.
Proposition 5. When I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, the venue’s optimal
choices are
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p)) =
(0, 0) , if l>H2 (p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H2(p), p<p2,
(1, 0) , if l≤H2(p), p≥p2,
(13)
where H2 (p) is defined in (10).
First, the venue becomes a POI if and only if l ≤ H2 (p).
Similar to H1 (p) in Situation I, H2 (p) shows, for a given p,
the maximum lump-sum fee under which the venue will
be a POI in Situation II. Second, when l ≤ H2 (p), the
venue’s optimal investment level I∗ (l, p) has two different
expressions: (a) when p < p2, the venue achieves a sufficient
total investment and attracts new visitors; (b) when p ≥ p2,
the venue does not invest because of the large per-player
charge.
4.2.3 Situation III: Large Initial Investment
In Proposition 6, we will see that when I0 > Ith, the venue’s
total investment is always sufficient, regardless of its chosen
investment level I∗ (l, p). In this situation, as long as the
venue becomes a POI, it attracts new visitors.
Proposition 6. When I0 > Ith, the venue’s optimal choices are
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p)) =
(0, 0) , if l>H3(p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H3(p), p<p3,
(1, 0) , if l≤H3(p), p≥p3,
(14)
where p3 , bη− k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)
2
δ(V+ηU)N2 andH3 (p) defined in (12)
are used to describe different conditions of the app’s tariff (l, p).
8H3 (p) ,
 − Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if p < p3,
(bη − p)N V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0 − pNη
U
cmax
, if p ≥ p3.
(12)
4.3 Stage I: App’s Two-Part Tariff
4.3.1 Problem Formulation
In Stage I, the app solves Problem 3, anticipating the venue’s
and users’ decisions in Stages II and III, respectively.
Problem 3. The app determines (l∗, p∗) by solving
maxRapp (l, p) , r∗ (l, p)
(
l + pNy¯ (r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p))
)
+ φNy¯ (r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p)) (15)
var. l, p ∈ R. (16)
Here,φ ≥ 0 is the unit advertising revenue, representing the app’s
advertising revenue because of a user’s interaction with the POI.
In (15), Rapp (l, p) is the app’s revenue, which has two
components: the venue’s payment based on the two-part
tariff, and the app’s advertising revenue. Function y¯ (r, I)
is given in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Functions r∗ (l, p) and
I∗ (l, p) are given in Propositions 4, 5, and 6.
We can easily extend our model to consider the case
where the app has a non-negligible cost ξ > 0 of support-
ing a user to interact with the POI (e.g., coordinating the
“battles” between this user and other users) by replacing
φ in (15) with φ − ξ. Furthermore, we focus on the mon-
etary payment between the app and venue in this work.
Our framework can be extended to analyze the app-venue
collaboration with non-monetary rewards, and we provide
the detailed discussions in Section V.2 of the supplemental
material.
4.3.2 Optimal Two-Part Tariff
We show the app’s optimal two-part tariff in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The app’s optimal two-part tariff is
p∗ = −φ, l∗ = H˜ (−φ) , (17)
where function H˜ (p) , p ∈ R, is defined as
H˜ (p) ,

H1 (p) , if I0 ≤ Ith and δ > δth,
H2 (p) , if I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth,
H3 (p) , if I0 > Ith.
(18)
The per-player charge p∗ ≤ 0 and the lump-sum fee l∗ ≥ 0.
From Propositions 4, 5, and 6, H˜ (p) is the maximum
lump-sum fee under which the venue will be a POI, given
the p. In practice, the app simply needs to compute its two-
part tariff based on (17) and (18), and charge the venue
accordingly. The computational complexity is O (1), which
does not increase with the system scale (e.g., the number of
users).
We first discuss the intuitions behind Theorem 1. With
p∗ ≤ 0, the app pays the venue based on the number of
users interacting with the POI. This incentivizes the venue
to invest in the app-related infrastructure, which attracts
more users to interact with the POI. When p∗ = −φ, we can
prove that the venue’s investment level in response to p∗
will also maximize the summation of the app’s revenue and
the venue’s payoff. Meanwhile, the app sets l∗ = H˜ (−φ),
which is the maximum lump-sum fee the venue will accept
under p∗ = −φ. With l∗ = H˜ (−φ), the app extracts all the
venue’s surplus. Hence, we can see that p∗ and l∗ maximize
the app’s revenue.
Theorem 1 leads to the following practical insights. The
app should announce a charge-with-subsidy scheme to the
venue: (i) in order to become a POI, the venue needs to pay
the app H˜ (−φ); (ii) every time a user interacts with the POI,
the app pays the venue φ (unit advertising revenue).
From Theorem 1, we can also see the challenge of con-
sidering the congestion effect and network effect. Based on
(17), (18), (9), (10), and (12), the optimal lump-sum fee l∗
has different concrete expressions under different parameter
settings, and the corresponding thresholds (such as δth,
Ith, p0, p1, p2, and p3) have complicated expressions. If
there is no congestion effect, it is equivalent to assuming
that I0 goes to infinity. We can prove that in this case, l∗
only has one possible expression, and the analysis of the
venue’s and users’ strategies can be significantly simplified.
Furthermore, if there is no network effect, the expressions of
those thresholds will be much simpler. For example, when
θ = 0, the value of δth becomes bV
2
kU .
4.3.3 Two-Part Tariff’s Performance
Next, we show that our two-part tariff scheme is optimal
among the class of tariff schemes that charge the venue
according to the venue’s choices r and I , the fraction of
users consuming the venue’s products (i.e., x¯ (r, I)), and the
fraction of users interacting with the POI (i.e., y¯ (r, I)). In-
tuitively, when maximizing the app’s revenue, we can focus
on this class of tariff schemes and do not need to consider
other tariff schemes (e.g., charge the venue according to
a particular user’s visiting decision), because the app and
venue are only interested in the fractions of users consuming
their products or using their services.
Note that the values of x¯ (r, I) and y¯ (r, I) are deter-
mined by r and I , as shown in Propositions 1, 2, and
3. Therefore, we call the abovementioned class of tariff
schemes as (r, I)-dependent tariff schemes, and the venue’s
payment to the app under any such a scheme can be
represented by function T (r, I) : {0, 1} × [0,∞) → R. For
example, our optimal two-part tariff scheme in Theorem 1 is
an (r, I)-dependent tariff scheme, and can be represented by
T (r, I)=r
(
H˜ (−φ)− φNy¯ (r, I)
)
. Once the venue becomes
a POI (i.e., r = 1), its payment to the app includes the lump-
sum fee (i.e., H˜ (−φ)) as well as the product between the
per-player charge (i.e., −φ) and the number of users inter-
acting with the POI (i.e., Ny¯ (r, I)). Note that the two state-
of-the-art schemes, i.e., per-player-only and lump-sum-only
tariff schemes, are also (r, I)-dependent tariff schemes.
We say an (r, I)-dependent tariff scheme is feasible if and
only if T (0, I) = 0, i.e., the venue need not pay the app
9when the venue does not become a POI. We introduce the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Our optimal two-part tariff scheme T (r, I) =
r
(
H˜ (−φ)− φNy¯ (r, I)
)
achieves the highest app’s revenue
among all feasible (r, I)-dependent tariff schemes.
As explained before, the venue’s choices under our op-
timal two-part tariff maximize the summation of the app’s
revenue and the venue’s payoff. Our optimal two-part tariff
also extracts all the venue’s surplus, which ensures our
tariff’s optimality among all feasible (r, I)-dependent tariffs.
4.3.4 App’s Revenue and Venue’s Payoff
Under l∗ and p∗, the app’s revenue and the venue’s payoff
are given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under l∗ and p∗, we have
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = H˜ (−φ) ≥ 0, (19)
Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) = bNη
U
cmax
. (20)
Based on (15) and p∗ = −φ, the app’s payment to the
venue due to the negative per-player charge cancels out the
app’s total advertising revenue. Hence, the app’s optimal
revenue equals its lump-sum fee, i.e., Rapp (l∗, p∗) = l∗ =
H˜ (−φ).
From (20), we see that the venue’s payoff under the
app’s optimal two-part tariff is bNηU/cmax, which equals
the venue’s payoff when it does not become a POI. This
is because we assume that the app has the market power.
In this case, the app can extract all the venue’s surplus via
the tariff. In Section W of the supplemental material, we
have studied a more general bargaining-based negotiation
model between the app and venue in Stage I. It is important
to note that the bargaining formulation only changes the
profit split between the app and venue, and does not affect
the venue’s choices in Stage II and the users’ decisions
in Stage III. Under the bargaining model, the per-player
charge will still be −φ, and the lump-sum fee will be
the product between H˜ (−φ) and a parameter capturing
the app’s bargaining power. Moreover, the venue’s payoff
increases with its bargaining power and can be higher than
bNηU/cmax. When both the app and venue have positive
bargaining power, the POI-based collaboration leads to a
win-win situation for them.
5 GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION
In this section, we analyze the influences of the venue’s
quality U , venue’s popularity η, and population size N on
the app’s optimal revenue. As shown by (18), (9), (10), and
(12), the dependence of H˜ (p)’s expression on these parame-
ters is very complicated. The thresholds, such as Ith, δth, p0,
p1, p2, and p3, are also affected by these parameters. These
make the analysis very challenging. The inherent reason
behind the complicated dependence is that each of these
parameters has different impacts on different components of
the app’s revenue, as explained in the following subsections.
The influences of the other parameters are intuitive (e.g.,
the app’s optimal revenue increases with the network effect
factor θ), and hence the corresponding analysis is omitted.
5.1 Influence of Venue’s Quality U
Recall that if a user has an intrinsic interest in the venue’s
products, parameter U captures the user’s utility of con-
suming the products. Hence, U reflects the venue’s quality.
Next, we discuss U ’s impact on the two components of the
app’s optimal revenue Rapp (l∗, p∗): the advertising revenue
and the venue’s payment. First, the advertising revenue
increases with U . When U increases, the venue attracts
more users with intrinsic interests in the offline products,
which increases the number of users interacting with the
POI. This enables the app to obtain a higher advertising
revenue. Second, the impact of U on the venue’s payment
depends on the relative intensity between the network effect
and congestion effect. When U increases, there are more initial
visitors (who visit the venue before it becomes a POI). After
the venue becomes a POI and makes sufficient investment,
the initial visitors generate a larger network effect and a
larger congestion effect to the new visitors. If the network
effect dominates over the congestion effect, the number of
new visitors to the venue increases with U , and hence the
venue’s payment increases with U ; otherwise, the number
of new visitors decreases with U , and the venue’s payment
decreases with U .
Parameter U ’s impact on Rapp (l∗, p∗) is jointly deter-
mined by U ’s impact on the advertising revenue and its
impact on the venue’s payment. Next, we introduce Propo-
sitions 7 and 8.
Proposition 7. When δ ≤ φcmaxI0bηN +θI0,Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases
with U ∈ (0,∞).
When δ ≤ φcmaxI0bηN + θI0, either the unit advertising
revenue φ or the network effect factor θ is large. If φ is large,
the app’s optimal revenue mainly consists of the advertising
revenue, which increases with U . If θ is large, the network
effect is large. Based on our prior discussion, in both cases,
the app’s optimal revenue increases with U . We illustrate
Proposition 7 in Fig. 5(a). We choose N = 400, cmax = 36,
V = 4.5, I0 = 1, k = 2, b = 3, η = 0.5, θ = 0.01, φ = 0.1,
and δ = 0.005. It is easy to verify that δ ≤ φcmaxI0bηN + θI0.
We observe that Rapp (l∗, p∗) as well as its two components
(venue’s payment and app’s advertising revenue) increase
with U .
Proposition 8. When δ > φcmaxI0bηN + θI0, R
app (l∗, p∗) de-
creases with U for U ∈
(
0, δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη
]
, and increases
with U for U ∈
[
δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη ,∞
)
.
When δ > φcmaxI0bηN + θI0, both φ and θ are small.
Hence, the app’s optimal revenue mainly consists of the
venue’s payment, and the network effect is small. When U
increases, the venue’s payment first decreases because of
the congestion effect. However, the marginal decrease in the
venue’s payment decreases with U .7 Therefore, the app’s
7. According to Theorem 1 and Propositions 4, 5, and 6, we can easily
prove that if the venue invests in the infrastructure at the equilibrium,
i.e., I∗ (l∗, p∗) > 0, the investment level I∗ (l∗, p∗) concavely increases
with U . This implies that the marginal increase in the venue’s total
investment cost kI∗ (l∗, p∗) decreases with U . As a result, the marginal
decreases in both the venue’s willingness to become a POI and its
payment to the app decrease with U .
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(b) Case δ > φcmaxI0
bηN
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Fig. 5: Illustrations of Propositions 7 and 8.
optimal revenue first decreases and then increases with U .
We illustrate Proposition 8 in Fig. 5(b). We let δ = 0.3, and
the other parameters are the same as in Fig. 5(a). It is easy
to verify that δ > φcmaxI0bηN + θI0. We can observe that the
venue’s payment convexly decreases with U , and the app’s
advertising revenue increases with U . Moreover, we can see
that Rapp (l∗, p∗) first decreases and then increases with U .
Based on our assumption in Section 3.4, U is upper-
bounded by cmax − V − θN . If δ is very large such that
δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2− Vη exceeds this upper bound, the app’s optimal
revenue will decrease with U for U ∈ (0, cmax − V − θN).
We formally show this result in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. When δ > δ1 ,
max
{
φcmaxI0
bηN + θI0,
(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2
(ηcmax+(1−η)V−ηθN)
k(bη+φ)
}
,
Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with U for U ∈ (0, cmax − V − θN).
Based on Proposition 7 and Corollary 2, if the app has
a small congestion effect factor and a large network effect
factor, it achieves a high revenue when cooperating with
a high-quality venue. If the app’s congestion effect factor
is very large, it achieves a high revenue when cooperating
with a low-quality venue, which is a surprising result.
In Table 1, we summarize these insights (and the other
insights derived in this section), which provide guidelines
for the app to select the optimal venue to collaborate with.
5.2 Influence of Venue’s Popularity η
The venue’s popularity η ∈ [0, 1] reflects the fraction of
users with intrinsic interests in the offline products. In
order to understand the impact of η on the app’s revenue,
we again examine its impacts on the advertising revenue
and the venue’s payment. Compared with U , parameter
η’s impact on the advertising revenue is similar, i.e., the
advertising revenue increases with η, but η’s impact on the
venue’s payment is more complicated. The impact of η on
the venue’s payment depends not only on the network effect
and congestion effect, but also on the following alignment
effect. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the app can gain
revenue by delivering advertisements to all types of users,
and the venue can only sell its products to the users with
intrinsic interests in the venue. When η increases, the app
and venue have more aligned interests in attracting the users,
and the venue is more willing to be a POI, which potentially
increases the venue’s payment.
In Proposition 9, we show η’s impact under a large unit
advertising revenue φ.
Proposition 9. When φ ≥ bV /U , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with
η ∈ (0,∞).
Recall that b is the venue’s profit due to one user’s
consumption of offline products. When φ ≥ bV /U , the unit
advertising revenue is large and the venue does not have
a strong incentive to become a POI because of the small
b. In this case, the app’s revenue mainly consists of the
advertising revenue rather than the venue’s payment. Since
the advertising revenue increases with η, the app’s revenue
increases with η.
Next, we use Lemma 2 to introduce δ2, and use Proposi-
tion 10 to show that when φ<bV /U and δ>δ2, surprisingly,
the app’s revenue may decrease with η.
Lemma 2. There is a unique δ ∈ (θI0,∞) that satisfies δ2 −
2θI0δ − bV 2kU δ + θ2I20 = 0, and we denote it by δ2.
Proposition 10. When φ < bVU and δ > δ2, R
app (l∗, p∗)
decreases with η for η ∈ (ηA, ηB), where ηA , (bV+φU)cmaxI02bUN(δ−θI0) ,
ηB , V cmaxI0UN(δ−θI0) , and ηA < ηB .
If φ < bV /U , the unit advertising revenue is small and
the venue has a strong incentive to be a POI because of the
large b. In this case, the app’s revenue mainly consists of
the venue’s payment rather than the advertising revenue. If
δ > δ2, the congestion effect is large, and may dominate over
the network effect and alignment effect. Hence, we show
that when φ < bV /U and δ > δ2, Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases
with η for η ∈ (ηA, ηB). When φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ2,
the analytical study of η’s impact on Rapp (l∗, p∗) is more
challenging because of the more complicated comparison
between the advertising revenue and venue’s payment (af-
fected by the network effect, congestion effect, and align-
ment effect). In Section X.1 of the supplemental material,
we numerically show that when φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ2,
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TABLE 1: Influences of System Parameters.
Parameter Conditions App’s Revenue Guidelines for Collaboration
U↑ and δ ≤ φcmaxI0bηN + θI0 always ↑ If an app has a small congestion effect factor (e.g., it is
bandwidth-efficient) and a large network effect factor (e.g.,
it encourages interactions among users), it should collaborate
U↑ and δ > δ1 always ↓ with a high-quality venue; if the congestion effect factor is
very large, the app should collaborate with a low-quality
venue.
η↑ and φ ≥ bVU always ↑ If the unit advertising revenue is large, an app should collab-
orate with a popular venue; otherwise, it may avoid collab-
η↑ and φ < bVU may ↓ orating with a popular venue.
N↑ and φ ≥ bVU always ↑ If the unit advertising revenue is large, an app should collab-
orate with a venue in a busy area; otherwise, it may avoid
N↑ and φ < bVU may ↓ collaborating with a venue in a busy area.
Rapp (l∗, p∗) may also decrease with η. The main insights
about η are summarized in Table 1.
5.3 Influence of Population Size N
Recall that N captures the population size. A large N
implies that the venue is located in a busy area. Compared
with U , parameterN has a similar impact on the advertising
revenue, i.e., the advertising revenue increases with N , but
has a more complicated impact on the venue’s payment.
Specifically, the impact of N on the venue’s payment de-
pends not only on the network effect and congestion effect,
but also on the following proximity effect. When N increases,
there are more users who are close to the venue. In this
case, it is easier for the venue to attract a large number
of visitors, since the average transportation cost of these
visitors decreases. Hence, the venue will be more willing to
be a POI, which potentially increases the venue’s payment.
In Proposition 11, we show N ’s impact under a large
unit advertising revenue φ.
Proposition 11. When φ ≥ bV /U , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with
N ∈ (0,∞).
The condition φ ≥ bV /U implies that the app’s revenue
mainly consists of the advertising revenue (affected by φ)
rather than the venue’s payment (affected by b). Since the
advertising revenue increases with N , the app’s revenue
increases with N .
Next, we use Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to introduce δ3
and NA, respectively. In Proposition 12, we show that when
φ < bV /U and δ > δ3, surprisingly, the app’s revenue may
decrease with N .
Lemma 3. There is a unique δ ∈ (θI0,∞) that satisfies δ2 −
2θI0δ − V
2(bη+φ)
k(V+ηU) δ + θ
2I20 = 0, and we denote it by δ3.
Lemma 4. When φ < bVU and δ > δ3, there is a unique N ∈(
0, V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0)
)
that satisfies
− bη2cmaxU (δ − θI0)2N2 + 2bη2c2maxI0U (θI0 − δ)N
+ bηc3maxI
2
0V + φ (ηU + V ) c
3
maxI
2
0 = 0. (21)
We denote this N by NA.
Proposition 12. When φ < bVU and δ > δ3, R
app (l∗, p∗)
decreases with N for N ∈ (NA, NB), where NB , V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) .
When φ < bV /U and δ > δ3, the venue has a strong
incentive to be a POI because of the large b, and hence
the app’s revenue mainly consists of the venue’s payment.
The congestion effect is large, and may dominate over the
network effect and proximity effect. Therefore, Rapp (l∗, p∗)
decreases with N for N ∈ (NA, NB). When φ < bV /U and
δ ≤ δ3, the analytical study of N ’s impact on Rapp (l∗, p∗) is
more challenging because of the more complicated compar-
ison between the advertising revenue and venue’s payment
(affected by the network effect, congestion effect, and prox-
imity effect). In Section X.2 of the supplemental material,
we use numerical results to show that when φ < bV /U and
δ ≤ δ3, Rapp (l∗, p∗) may also decrease with N . The main
insights about N are summarized in Table 1.
6 TWO-PART TARIFF UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In Section 4.3, we assume that before the venue becomes
a POI, the app knows the exact unit advertising revenue
φ and hence is able to set the optimal tariff (l∗, p∗) =
(H˜ (−φ) ,−φ). However, the assumption may not always
hold in practice. For example, if the advertisers pay the app
based on the click-through rates of their advertisements, the
app will know the exact unit advertisement revenue only
after the venue becomes a POI and the users interact with
the POI. Therefore, the app will be uncertain about φ when
designing the tariff in Stage I.
In this section, we relax the assumption and extend
Problem 3 in Section 4.3 by considering an app which
decides its tariff only with the probabilistic information of
φ. Meanwhile, we investigate the impact of the app’s risk
preference on the optimal two-part tariff. Under uncertainty
about φ, the app solves Problem 4 in Stage I (the uncertainty
of φ does not affect Stages II and III).
Problem 4. The app determines (l∗u, p
∗
u) by solving
maxEφ
{
J
(
Rapp (lu, pu)
)}
(22)
var. lu, pu ∈ R, (23)
where φ ∈ [φmin, φmax] (0 ≤ φmin < φmax) is a random
variable that follows a general distribution. Function J (·) is the
app’s utility, with J ′ (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ R.
Here, Rapp (·, ·) is the app’s revenue function defined
in (15) (it is also called the app’s wealth in the expected
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Fig. 6: Comparison Between Tariffs.
utility theory). The utility function J (·) reflects the app’s
risk preference [38]. In (22), the app maximizes its expected
utility via the tariff, where the expectation is taken with
respect to φ. We discuss the app’s optimal two-part tariff
in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. We characterize the optimal two-part tariff under
the uncertainty about φ as follows:
• Risk-neutral app (J ′′ (z) = 0, z ∈ R): p∗u =
−E {φ} , l∗u = H˜ (−E {φ});
• Risk-averse app (J ′′ (z) < 0, z ∈ R): −E {φ} ≤ p∗u ≤
−φmin, l∗u = H˜ (p∗u) ≤ H˜ (−E {φ});
• Risk-seeking app (J ′′ (z) > 0, z ∈ R): −φmax ≤ p∗u ≤
−E {φ} , l∗u = H˜ (p∗u) ≥ H˜ (−E {φ}).
A risk-neutral app’s optimal tariff (in the first bullet)
is similar to the one in the complete information case, by
replacing φ in (17) with E {φ}. Compared with a risk-neutral
app, a risk-averse app (with a concave utility function J (·))
should set a higher per-player charge p∗u and a lower lump-
sum fee l∗u. This strategy reduces the risk faced by the app.
First, when the app increases p∗u (p
∗
u ≤ 0), it provides a
smaller subsidy for the venue to invest in the infrastructure.
As a result, the investment level decreases, and the fraction
of users interacting with the POI also decreases. According
to the app’s revenue defined in (15), this reduces the dif-
ference between the app’s revenues under different φ, and
hence reduces the risk faced by the app. Second, when the
app increases p∗u, it has to decrease l
∗
u to motivate the venue
to become a POI.
Compared with a risk-neutral app, a risk-seeking app
should set a lower per-player charge p∗u (hence a larger
subsidy) and a higher lump-sum fee l∗u to increase the risk
faced by the app. The detailed explanations are opposite to
those for a risk-averse app.
In Section Y of the supplemental material, we provide a
numerical approach to compute p∗u and l
∗
u for the risk-averse
and risk-seeking apps (in the second and third bullets), and
numerically investigate the impacts of the degrees of app’s
risk aversion and risk seeking on the p∗u and l
∗
u.
We can extend our work to consider other incomplete
information cases. For example, the app only knows the
probability distribution of U . In this case, when the two-part
tariff is fixed, the users’ and venue’s equilibrium strategies
under any given U are still characterized by Propositions 1-
6. Hence, for a fixed two-part tariff, the app can compute its
expected revenue based on the users’ and venue’s strategies
and the probability distribution of U . Then, the app can
decide its optimal two-part tariff by choosing the one that
maximizes its expected revenue.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare our two-part tariff scheme with
two state-of-the-art tariff schemes: the lump-sum-only tariff
(e.g., used by Snapchat), where the app charges the venue
based on the lump-sum fee l∗only = arg maxl∈RR
app (l, 0);
the per-player-only tariff (e.g., used by Pokemon Go), where
the app charges the venue based on the per-player charge
p∗only = arg maxp∈RR
app (0, p).8
We will answer the following question: how does our two-
part tariff’s performance improvement over the two state-of-the-
art tariffs change with system parameters (e.g., δ, θ, and φ)?
The answer can help the apps that currently use lump-sum-
only tariff or per-player-only tariff understand whether it is
worth switching to the two-part tariff.
7.1 Impact of Congestion Effect Factor δ
In Fig. 6(a), we compare the three schemes under different
congestion effect factor δ. We choose N = 200, cmax = 24,
U = 3, V = 5, I0 = 0.6, k = 3, b = 1, η = 0.2, θ =
0.05, and φ = 0.4. We change δ from 0.1 to 0.5, and plot
the app’s total revenues Rapp (solid curves) and advertising
revenues (dash curves) under different schemes with respect
to δ. Since there is no randomness in the experiment, we
only need one simulation run to get the plot.
First, we observe that the two-part tariff always achieves
the highest app’s total revenue (solid blue curve), compared
to the per-player-only tariff and the lump-sum-only tariff
schemes, which is consistent with Theorem 2. For example,
the two-part tariff improves the app’s total revenue over the
per-player-only tariff by at least 55% for all δ’s values shown
in Fig. 6(a). Second, the two-part tariff always achieves the
highest app’s advertising revenue (dash blue curve), which
8. Another possible tariff scheme is the usage-based tariff, where the
app charges the venue based on the users’ overall usage of the app
at the venue. It is reasonable to assume that if a user interacts with
the POI, its usage of the app at the venue is a random variable that
is independent of the user’s attributes ω and c. In this case, the users’
overall usage of the app at the venue is proportional to the number of
users interacting with the POI at the venue. Hence, the performance of
the usage-based tariff is the same as that of the per-player-only tariff.
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implies that it also achieves the highest number of users
interacting with the POI. This is because the two-part tariff
has the lowest per-player charge, and can best incentivize
the venue to invest in the app-related infrastructure and
relieve the congestion.
When δ is medium (e.g., 0.2 ≤ δ ≤ 0.35), the two-
part tariff significantly improves the app’s total revenue
compared with the lump-sum-only tariff. To understand
this, note that the solid blue curve could be below the dash
blue curve under the two-part tariff. This means that the
app pays the venue to incentivize the investment. Under
the lump-sum-only tariff, the app cannot incentivize in-
vestment by paying the venue. Hence, when δ is medium,
the two-part tariff relieves the congestion, and significantly
outperforms the lump-sum-only tariff. When δ is small (e.g.,
δ < 0.2), the congestion does not heavily reduce the users’
payoffs, so whether the venue is incentivized to invest does
not strongly affect the number of users interacting with the
POI; when δ is large (e.g., δ > 0.35), the congestion cannot
be efficiently relieved even with the investment. In both
cases, the gap between the app’s total revenues under the
two-part tariff and lump-sum-only tariff is smaller.
7.2 Impact of Network Effect Factor θ
In Fig. 6(b), we compare the three tariff schemes under
different network effect factor θ (from 0 to 0.05). We let
δ = 0.1, and the other parameters are the same as in Fig.
6(a). When θ = 0, the two-part tariff improves the app’s
total revenue over the per-player-only tariff by 36%. When
θ = 0.05, this improvement becomes more significant, i.e.,
58%. This is because a large network effect factor enables
the POI to attract many visitors, and the venue is willing
to pay the app for becoming a POI. Under the two-part
tariff, the app can set a large lump-sum fee to receive a high
venue’s payment. Under the per-player-only tariff, the app
cannot set a large per-player charge to obtain a high venue’s
payment, since this will reduce the venue’s investment, the
number of users interacting with the POI, and the app’s
advertising revenue.
7.3 Impact of Unit Advertising Revenue φ
In Fig. 6(c), we compare the three tariff schemes under
different unit advertising revenue φ (from 0.3 to 1.7). We
choose δ = 0.1, and the other parameters are the same as
in Fig. 6(a). We can observe that when φ is large, the two-
part tariff significantly outperforms the other two schemes.
For example, when φ = 1.7, the two-part tariff improves
the app’s total revenue over the per-player-only tariff and
lump-sum-only tariff by 39% and 51%, respectively. This
is because the two-part tariff best incentivizes the venue’s
investment, and hence results in the highest number of users
interacting with the POI. When φ is large, the two-part tariff
achieves a much higher app’s total revenue than the other
two schemes.
We summarize the key insights obtained from the nu-
merical results as follows.
Observation 1. If the congestion effect factor is medium or
the unit ad revenue is large, our tariff significantly outperforms
the lump-sum-only tariff. If the network effect factor or the unit
ad revenue is large, our tariff significantly outperforms the per-
player-only tariff.
These insights are robust to the change in the parameter
settings. In Section Z of our supplemental material, we pro-
vide more numerical results, and show that these insights
hold under different parameter settings.
8 CONCLUSION
The economics of the online apps (especially the augmented
reality apps) and offline venues’ collaboration is a fast-
emerging business area. The POI-based collaboration is
increasingly popular, but there are no prior analytical stud-
ies to investigate the collaboration schemes and character-
ize the equilibria. We designed a charge-with-subsidy tariff
scheme, which achieves the highest app’s revenue among all
feasible (r, I)-dependent tariff schemes. Our tariff scheme
also significantly improves the users’ engagements with the
venues, compared with the state-of-the-art tariff schemes.
Moreover, we provided some counter-intuitive guidelines
for the collaboration. For example, a bandwidth-consuming
app should collaborate with a low-quality venue, and an
app with a small unit advertising revenue may avoid col-
laborating with a venue that is popular or in a busy area.
Our work opens up exciting directions for future works.
Since most apps currently collaborate with store/restaurant
chains, we considered the collaboration between an app
and a store/restaurant chain’s representative venue in this
paper. For future research, it is interesting to study the
collaboration between an app and multiple venues owned
by different entities in the same area. This extension will
be challenging. The users need to decide which venues to
visit, by comparing both the qualities of the venues’ offline
products and the venues’ investment levels on the app-
related infrastructure (related to the qualities of the online
products). Moreover, when there are multiple apps, the
problem’s analysis will be more challenging. If an app pays
a venue to incentivize its investment in the infrastructure,
this potentially benefits other apps. This is because the
users who choose to play other apps can also use this
infrastructure. Intuitively, when there are multiple apps, the
users will be better off, and more users can play apps.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILS OF OUR SURVEY
In this section, we show the illustrations for the key results
of our survey.
A.1 Respondents’ Basic Information
In Fig. 7, we show the distribution of the respondents’ ages.
81% of the respondents are between 18 and 30 years old.
In Fig. 8, we show the distribution of the duration of
respondents’ game experience. We can see that 53% of the
respondents have played Pokemon Go for more than one
month.
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Fig. 7: Ages of Respondents.
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Fig. 8: Duration of Respondents’ Game Experience.
A.2 Impact of POIs’ Infrastructure
We asked “What types of infrastructure at the sponsored
PokeStops/Gyms might enhance your experience of playing Poke-
mon Go”, and illustrate the responses in Fig. 9. Note that this
is a multi-choice question.
76.7% of the respondents thought that the Wi-Fi net-
works at the sponsored PokeStops/Gyms (i.e., POIs) might
enhance their experience. 45.6% of the respondents and
40.8% of the respondents thought that the air conditioners
and smartphone chargers might enhance their experience.
19.4% of the respondents (including the respondent who
chose “nothing”) answered that the infrastructure had negli-
gible impacts on their game experience. That is to say, the in-
frastructure, such as Wi-Fi networks, smartphone chargers,
and air conditioners, could enhance the game experience of
80.6%(=100%-19.4%) of the respondents.
Fig. 9: Infrastructure That Enhances Game Experience.
We asked “Do you think the sponsored PokeStops/Gyms
could become more attractive to you through investing on their
infrastructure (e.g., having faster Wi-Fi Internet, better air condi-
tioning, or more smartphone chargers)”, and invited the respon-
dents to rate their degrees of agreements (7 means “surely”).
We illustrate the respondents’ ratings in Fig. 10. We can
see that almost half of the respondents chose high values
(i.e., 5, 6, or 7), which implies the need for infrastructure’s
investment.
2Fig. 10: Respondents’ Opinions Towards Infrastructure’s Investment.
A.3 Externalities Among Players
We asked “Suppose you are using the Wi-Fi service at a
sponsored PokeStop/Gym to play Pokemon Go, do you think the
Wi-Fi speed will affect your experience of playing the game”,
and collected the respondents’ ratings of their degrees of
agreements (7 means “surely”). We illustrate the responses
in Fig. 11, and can find that 59.3% of the respondents chose
high values (i.e., 5, 6, or 7). In particular, among the fractions
of the respondents choosing different values, the fraction of
the respondents choosing 7 is the largest one.
Fig. 11: Impact of Wi-Fi Speed.
We asked “When you play Pokemon Go, if there are nearby
people playing the game as well, will this enhance your game
experience”, and collected the respondents’ ratings of their
degrees of agreements (7 means “surely”). We illustrate the
responses in Fig. 12, and find that 64% of the respondents
chose high values (i.e., 5, 6, or 7).
Fig. 12: Impact of Nearby Players’ Engagements in Pokemon Go.
APPENDIX B
NOTATION TABLE
We summarize our paper’s key notations in Table 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 IN SECTION 4.1
Proof. According to (3), when r = 0, a type-(ω, c) user can
only choose d = 0 or d = 1. From (1), the user’s payoff is 0
under d = 0, and is Uω − c under d = 1. Based on endnote
5, the user chooses d = 1 if and only if c < Uω.
TABLE 2: Key Notations.
Decision Variables
d ∈ {0, 1, 2} User’s visiting and interaction decision
r ∈ {0, 1} Venue’s POI choice
I ≥ 0 Venue’s investment choice
l ∈ R App’s lump-sum fee
p ∈ R App’s per-player charge
Parameters
N > 0 Mass of users
c ∈ [0, cmax] A user’s attribute indicating its trans-
portation cost
ω ∈ {0, 1} A user’s attribute indicating its inter-
est in the venue’s offline products
η ∈ [0, 1] Fraction of users with ω = 1 (reflect
venue’s popularity)
U > 0 Utility of a user with ω = 1 when
it consumes offline products (reflect
venue’s quality)
V > 0 A user’s base utility of interacting
with the POI
θ ≥ 0 Network effect factor
δ > 0 Congestion effect factor
I0 ≥ 0 Venue’s initial investment level
b > 0 Venue’s profit due to one user’s con-
sumption of its products
k > 0 Venue’s unit investment cost
φ ≥ 0 App’s unit advertising revenue
Functions
x¯ (r, I) ∈ [0, 1] Fraction of users consuming venue’s
products (have ω = 1 and visit venue)
y¯ (r, I) ∈ [0, 1] Fraction of users interacting with POI
Πuser(ω, c, d, r,I) A type-(ω, c) user’s payoff function
Πvenue (r, I, l, p) Venue’s payoff function
Rapp (l, p) App’s revenue function
H˜ (p) Maximum lump-sum fee under which
venue becomes a POI, given per-
player charge p
Hence, when r = 0, a type-(ω, c) user’s optimal strategy
is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =
{
1, if c ∈ [0, Uω) ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω, cmax] , (24)
where ω ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ [0, cmax].
Recall that x¯ (r, I) is the fraction of users who have ω = 1
and choose d = 1 or 2. Based on (24), we compute x¯ (r, I)
by
x¯ (r, I) = η
∫ U
0
1
cmax
dc = η
U
cmax
. (25)
Recall that y¯ (r, I) is the fraction of users who choose d = 2.
Based on (24), we have y¯ (r, I) = 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 IN SECTION 4.1
Proof. (Step 1) we prove that V + θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N = 0 holds at the equilibrium (a user’s
net payoff of interacting with the POI at the equilibrium
3is zero). We prove it by contradiction, and assume that
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N 6= 0.
First, we discuss the possibility of V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N < 0. When V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N <
0, we can see that y¯ (r, I) 6= 0. Moreover, the frac-
tion y¯ (r, I)’s definition implies that y¯ (r, I) ≥ 0. Hence,
y¯ (r, I) > 0 (the fraction of users interacting with the POI
is positive). Because V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N < 0
(a user’s net payoff of interacting with the POI at the
equilibrium is negative), a user who interacts with the
POI at the equilibrium can strictly improve its payoff by
switching its strategy from d = 2 to d = 1. This violates
the concept of equilibrium. Therefore, it is impossible that
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N < 0.
Second, we discuss the possibility of V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N > 0. When V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N >
0 holds at the equilibrium, all the users with c < Uω can
maximize their payoffs by interacting with the POI at the
equilibrium based on (1). In other words, all the users with
c < Uω choose d = 2 at the equilibrium, and the fraction
y¯ (r, I) is no smaller than the fraction of users with c <
Uω. Recall that c is uniformly distributed in [0, cmax]. The
fraction of users with c < Uω is η Ucmax , and hence y¯ (r, I) ≥
η Ucmax . Recall that the conditions of Case B include I + I0 ≤
Ith =
δ
θ+V cmaxηUN
. We can easily derive
θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N ≤ −V cmax
ηU
y¯ (r, I) . (26)
Considering y¯ (r, I) ≥ η Ucmax , we have
θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N ≤ −V. (27)
This contradicts with V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N >
0. Therefore, it is impossible that V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N > 0.
Combing the above analysis, we conclude that
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N = 0.
(Step 2) Next, we discuss the users’ equilibrium
strategies. According to (1), since V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N = 0, a user’s payoffs under decision d = 1
and decision d = 2 are the same, i.e., Uω − c. Hence, when
c ≥ Uω, the user chooses d = 0; otherwise, the user chooses
between d = 1 and 2. This implies that (i) all the users with
ω = 0 choose d = 0 at the equilibrium, (ii) the users with
ω = 1 and c ≥ U choose d = 0 at the equilibrium, (iii) the
users with ω = 1 and c < U choose between d = 1 and 2 at
the equilibrium. Next, we discuss the detailed equilibrium
strategies of the users with ω = 1 and c < U .
From V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N = 0, we have
y¯ (r, I)N =
V(
δ
I+I0
− θ
) . (28)
That is to say, among the users with ω = 1 and c < U ,
the mass of users choosing d = 2 is V(
δ
I+I0
−θ
) , and the
remaining users with ω = 1 and c < U choose d = 1.
For a set Cˆ, it can represent the set of transportation costs of
the users who have ω = 1 and c < U and choose d = 2 if
and only if
ηN
∫ U
0
1
cmax
1{c∈Cˆ}dc =
V(
δ
I+I0
− θ
) . (29)
Therefore, we conclude that when r = 1 and I + I0 ≤ Ith, a
type-(ω, c) user’s optimal strategy is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =

2, if c ∈ Cˆ and ω = 1,
1, if c ∈ [0, Uω) \ Cˆ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω, cmax] ,
(30)
where ω ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ [0, cmax], and Cˆ ⊆ [0, U) can be any
set that satisfies η
∫ U
0
1
cmax
1{c∈Cˆ}dc = V( δ
I+I0
−θ
)
N
. We can
easily derive x¯ (r, I) = η Ucmax and y¯ (r, I) =
V(
δ
I+I0
−θ
)
N
from (30) and (28), respectively.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 IN SECTION 4.1
Proof. (Step 1) we prove that V + θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N > 0 holds at the equilibrium (a user’s net
payoff of interacting with the POI at the equilibrium is
positive). We prove it by contradiction, i.e., we assume that
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N ≤ 0.
The proof of the impossibility of V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N < 0 is the same as that in the proof of
Proposition 2 (Section D), and is omitted here.
Next we discuss the possibility of V + θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N = 0. According to (1), when V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N = 0, a user’s payoff under decision d = 2 is
Uω − c. Hence, a user may choose d = 2 only if c < Uω.
That is to say, the fraction of users choosing d = 2 is
no greater than the fraction of users with c < Uω, i.e.,
y¯ (r, I) ≤ η Ucmax . Recall that the conditions of Case C include
I + I0 > Ith =
δ
θ+V cmaxηUN
. We can easily derive the following
relation
θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N > −V cmax
ηU
y¯ (r, I) . (31)
Considering y¯ (r, I) ≤ η Ucmax , we have
θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N > −V. (32)
This contradicts with V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N =
0. Therefore, it is impossible that V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N = 0.
Combing the above analysis, we conclude that
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N > 0.
(Step 2) Next, we discuss the users’ equilibrium strate-
gies. From V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N > 0 and (1), a
user’s payoff under d = 2 is always strictly larger than
its payoff under d = 1. That is to say, no user chooses
d = 1 at the equilibrium. Comparing a user’s payoffs under
d = 0 and d = 2, we conclude that a user whose c and
ω satisfy Uω − c + V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N > 0
chooses d = 2, and a user whose c and ω satisfy Uω −
c+V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N ≤ 0 chooses d = 0. Since
we assume U + V + θN < cmax in Section 3.4, we have
4U + V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N < cmax. Therefore, we
can compute y¯ (r, I) as
y¯ (r, I) =η
1
cmax
(
U + V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N
)
+ (1− η) 1
cmax
(
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N
)
=
1
cmax
(
ηU + V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δ
I + I0
y¯ (r, I)N
)
.
(33)
After arrangement, we have
y¯ (r, I) =
(ηU + V ) (I + I0)
(cmax − θN) (I + I0) + δN
= η
U
cmax
+
V cmax (I + I0)− ηUNδ + ηUNθ (I + I0)
c2max (I + I0) + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθ (I + I0)
=
ηU + ct
cmax
. (34)
Recall that a user whose c and ω satisfy Uω − c +
V+θy¯ (r, I)N − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N > 0 chooses d = 2, and
a user whose c and ω satisfy Uω − c + V+θy¯ (r, I)N −
δ
I+I0
y¯ (r, I)N ≤ 0 chooses d = 0. Based on (34), we
conclude that when r = 1 and I + I0 > Ith, a type-(ω, c)
user’s optimal strategy is
d∗ (ω, c, r, I) =
{
2, if c ∈ [0, Uω + ct) ,
0, if c ∈ [Uω + ct, cmax] , (35)
where ω ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ [0, cmax]. From (35), we can
easily compute x¯ (r, I) = ηU+ctcmax . Moreover, fraction y¯ (r, I)
is given in (34).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 IN SECTION 4.2
Proof. (Step 1) We compute the venue’s optimal payoffs in
the following three decision regions: (i) r = 0; (ii) r = 1 and
I ∈ [0, Ith − I0]; (iii) r = 1 and I ∈ (Ith − I0,∞).
First, in decision region (i) (i.e., r = 0), the venue’s payoff
is
Πvenue (0, I, l, p) = bNx¯ (0, I)− kI − 0 · (l + pNy¯ (0, I))
= bNη
U
cmax
− kI, (36)
where x¯ (0, I) is computed by Proposition 1. It is easy to
see that the venue’s optimal payoff in this decision region is
bNη Ucmax , and the optimal investment level is 0.
Second, in decision region (ii) (i.e., r = 1 and I ∈
[0, Ith − I0]), the venue’s payoff is
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) = bNx¯ (1, I)− kI − 1 · (l + pNy¯ (1, I))
= bNη
U
cmax
− kI −
(
l + p
V
δ
I+I0
− θ
)
,
(37)
where x¯ (1, I) and y¯ (1, I) are computed by Proposi-
tion 2. By examining ∂Π
venue(1,I,l,p)
∂I , we can find that
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) either (a) monotonically changes or (b) first
decreases and then increases in I ∈ [0, Ith − I0]. Hence, in
order to obtain the venue’s optimal payoff in this decision
region, we only need to compare its payoffs under I = 0
and I = Ith − I0. Specifically, we have
Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη
U
cmax
− l − V
δ
I0
− θ p. (38)
Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) = bNη U
cmax
− k (Ith − I0)
−
(
l + p
ηUN
cmax
)
. (39)
Comparing Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) and Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p),
we have Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) > Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) if and
only if p > p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN . Therefore, if p >
p0, the venue’s optimal payoff in decision region (ii) is
Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp, and the optimal
investment level is 0; if p ≤ p0, the venue’s optimal payoff in
this decision region is Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax −
k (Ith − I0)−
(
l + pηUNcmax
)
, and the optimal investment level
is Ith − I0.
Third, in decision region (iii) (i.e., r = 1 and I ∈
(Ith − I0,∞)), the venue’s payoff is given as follows.
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) = −kI − l
+bN
(
η
U
cmax
+η
V cmax (I + I0)− ηUNδ + ηUNθ (I + I0)
c2max (I + I0) + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθ (I + I0)
)
−pN
(
η
U
cmax
+
V cmax (I + I0)− ηUNδ + ηUNθ (I + I0)
c2max (I + I0) + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθ (I + I0)
)
.
(40)
We can compute
∂Πvenue (1, I, l, p)
∂I
=
δN2 (bη − p) (V + ηU)
(δN + (I + I0)(cmax −Nθ))2
− k.
(41)
If p ≥ bη, payoff Πvenue (1, I, l, p) decreases with I for
I > Ith − I0. The venue’s optimal payoff in this decision
region is smaller than (b− p)Nη Ucmax − k (Ith − I0) − l,
which is exactly Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) given in (39).
If p < bη, we can derive the relation ∂
2Πvenue(1,I,l,p)
∂I2 < 0.
Based on (41), the solution to ∂Π
venue(1,I,l,p)
∂I = 0 is
I = Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0. Hence,
when Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 > Ith − I0,
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) increases with I for Ith − I0 < I ≤
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0, and decreases
with I for I ≥ Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0.
Therefore, the venue’s optimal investment level in this
region is Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0, and the
corresponding optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0.
Furthermore, this optimal payoff is greater than
(b− p)Nη Ucmax − k (Ith − I0) − l, which is ex-
actly Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) given in (39). When
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 ≤ Ith − I0,
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) decreases with I for I > Ith − I0.
Therefore, the venue’s optimal payoff in this decision
region is smaller than (b− p)Nη Ucmax − k (Ith − I0) − l,
5which is exactly Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) given in (39).
Note that Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 >
Ith − I0 = δθ+V cmaxηUN − I0 is equivalent to p < p1 =
bη − δk(V+ηU)c2max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 . Therefore, we can summarize the
venue’s optimal payoff in decision region (iii) as follows.
If p < p1, the venue’s optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0, and the
optimal investment level is Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k −
δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0. Furthermore, the venue’s optimal payoff
is greater than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) given in (39). If
p ≥ p1, the venue’s optimal payoff is smaller than
Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p).
So far, we have analyzed the venue’s optimal payoffs
in different decision regions. We will jointly consider and
compare these optimal payoffs to determine the venue’s
equilibrium strategies in situation I.
(Step 2) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strategies
under p < p1. In Situation I, we have δ > δth. Based
on the definitions of p0 and p1, it is easy to show that
p0 > p1. Hence, we have p < p1 < p0. Based on
Step 1, the venue’s optimal payoff in decision region (i)
is Πvenue (0, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff in de-
cision region (ii) is Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p), and its opti-
mal payoff in decision region (iii) is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0, which
is greater than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). Considering the
three decision regions, we conclude that if l ≤
− Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+
kI0, the venue’s optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0, and the
corresponding optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and
I∗ (l, p) = Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0; oth-
erwise, the venue’s optimal payoff is bNη Ucmax , and the
corresponding optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and
I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 3) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strategies
under p1 ≤ p ≤ p0. Based on Step 1, the venue’s op-
timal payoff in decision region (i) is Πvenue (0, 0, l, p) =
bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff in decision region (ii)
is Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − k (Ith − I0) −(
l + pηUNcmax
)
, and its optimal payoff in decision region (iii) is
smaller than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). Considering the three
decision regions, we conclude that if l ≤ −pNη Ucmax −
k (Ith − I0), the venue’s optimal payoff is bNη Ucmax −
k (Ith − I0) −
(
l + pηUNcmax
)
, and the corresponding optimal
strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) = Ith−I0; otherwise,
the venue’s optimal payoff is bNη Ucmax , and the correspond-
ing optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 4) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strategies
under p > p0. Since p0 > p1, we have p > p0 > p1.
Based on Step 1, the venue’s optimal payoff in decision
region (i) is Πvenue (0, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff
in decision region (ii) is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − l −
V
δ
I0
−θp, which is greater than Π
venue (1, Ith − I0, l, p), and
its optimal payoff in decision region (iii) is smaller than
Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). Considering the three decision re-
gions, we conclude that if l ≤ − Vδ
I0
−θp, the venue’s optimal
payoff is bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp, and the corresponding op-
timal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) = 0; otherwise,
the venue’s optimal payoff is bNη Ucmax , and the correspond-
ing optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
Summarizing Step 2, Step 3, and Step 4, we derive the
venue’s equilibrium strategies as
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p))=
(0, 0) , if l>H1(p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H1(p), p<p1,
(1, Ith − I0) , if l≤H1(p), p1≤p≤p0,
(1, 0) , if l≤H1(p), p>p0,
which is exactly (11).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 IN SECTION 4.2
Proof. First of all, we can easily show that δ ≤ δth implies
p0 ≤ p1. Then, we define function G (p) as
G (p) , N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ p. (42)
We will prove that when I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, there is a
unique p satisfying p ∈ [p0, p1] and G (p) = 0.
(Step 1) We prove that G (p) is strictly decreasing in p ∈
[p0, p1) in Situation II (I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth). From (42), we
can compute
dG (p)
dp
=− N (V + ηU)
cmax − θN +
N
√
δk
√
V + ηU
(cmax −Nθ)
√
bη − p +
V
δ
I0
− θ
(a)
< − NηU
cmax −Nθ +
NθηUN
(cmax − θN) cmax +
V
δ
I0
− θ
(b)
≤ − NηU
cmax −Nθ +
NθηUN
(cmax − θN) cmax +
ηUN
cmax
=0. (43)
The inequality (a) is because of p < p1, and inequality (b)
is because of I ≤ Ith. Since dG(p)dp < 0 for p < p1, G (p) is
strictly decreasing in p ∈ [p0, p1).
(Step 2) We prove that G (p1) ≤ 0 in Situation II (I0 ≤
Ith and δ ≤ δth). By plugging p1 = bη− δk(V+ηU)c
2
max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 into
(42), we have
G (p1) =
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
δk (V + ηU) cmax
V cmax + θηUN
−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ
(
bη − δk (V + ηU) c
2
max
(V cmax + θηUN)
2
)
.
(44)
6In order to prove that G (p1) ≤ 0 for I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth,
we define
Q (I0) ,
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
δk (V + ηU) cmax
V cmax + θηUN
−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ
(
bη − δk (V + ηU) c
2
max
(V cmax + θηUN)
2
)
.
(45)
First, we plug I0 = Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN
into the above
equation, and obtain Q (Ith) = 0.
Second, we prove thatQ (I0) is increasing in I0 ∈ [0, Ith].
From (45), we can compute
(δ − θI0)2 (V cmax + θηUN) dQ (I0)
dI0
= −V δ2k (ηU + V ) c2max
+ k (δ − θI0)2 (V cmax + θηUN)2 + V δbη (V cmax + θηUN)2 .
(46)
Since δ ≤ δth = (V cmax+θηUN)(bη(V cmax+θηUN)−θI0cmaxk)kcmaxηU(cmax−θN) ,
we further have
(δ − θI0)2 (V cmax + θηUN) dQ (I0)
dI0
≥ −V δ2k (ηU + V ) c2max
+ k (δ − θI0)2 (V cmax + θηUN)2 + V δ2kcmaxηU (cmax − θN)
+ θI0cmaxk (V cmax + θηUN)V δ. (47)
We define function S (I0) as the right-hand side of (47):
S(I0),−V δ2k (ηU+V ) c2max+k (δ − θI0)2(V cmax+θηUN)2
+V δ2kcmaxηU (cmax − θN)+θI0cmaxk (V cmax + θηUN)V δ.
(48)
We can easily show that dS(I0)dI0 ≤ 0 for I0 ∈ [0, Ith], and
S (Ith) = 0. Hence, S (I0) ≥ 0 for I0 ∈ [0, Ith]. Because
S (I0) is the right-hand side of (47), we have
dQ(I0)
dI0
≥ 0 for
I0 ∈ [0, Ith].
Combing Q (Ith) = 0 and
dQ(I0)
dI0
≥ 0 for I0 ∈ [0, Ith], we
can see that Q (I0) ≤ 0 for I0 ∈ [0, Ith]. Since the expression
of Q (I0) in (45) is the same as the expression of G (p1) in
(44), we conclude that G (p1) ≤ 0 in Situation II.
(Step 3) We prove that G (p0) ≥ 0 in Situation II (I0 ≤
Ith and δ ≤ δth). By plugging p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN into
(42), we have
G (p0) = − N
cmax
bη2U +
θηUNkI0
V cmax + θηUN
+
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V +ηU)
(
bη+k
(δ − θI0) cmax
V cmax + θηUN
)
−
√
δk
)2
.
(49)
In order to prove that G (p0) ≥ 0 for I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤
δth, we define
W (δ) , − N
cmax
bη2U +
θηUNkI0
V cmax + θηUN
+
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V +ηU)
(
bη+k
(δ − θI0) cmax
V cmax + θηUN
)
−
√
δk
)2
.
(50)
First, we prove
√
(V + ηU)
(
bη + k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN
)
>
√
δk. Note that
√
(V + ηU) (bη − p1) =√
δk V cmax+ηUcmaxV cmax+ηUθN >
√
δk, where the inequality is because
of the assumption cmax > U + V + θN . In Situation II, p0 ≤
p1. Hence,
√
(V + ηU) (bη − p0) ≥
√
(V + ηU) (bη − p1) >√
δk. Because p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN , we can see that√
(V + ηU)
(
bη + k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN
)
>
√
δk.
Second, we can prove W (δth) = 0 by plugging δ =
δth =
(V cmax+θηUN)(bη(V cmax+θηUN)−θI0cmaxk)
kcmaxηU(cmax−θN) into (50).
Third, we prove that function W (δ) is decreas-
ing in δ ∈ (0, δth]. Since we already have (50)
and the result
√
(V + ηU)
(
bη + k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN
)
>
√
δk,
we only need to prove that function Wˆ (δ) ,√
(V + ηU)
(
bη + k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN
)
− √δk is decreasing in
δ ∈ (0, δth]. We compute dWˆ (δ)dδ as
dWˆ (δ)
dδ
= −
√
k
2
√
δ
+
1
2
√
V + ηU
V cmax + θηUN
kcmax√
bηV cmax + bη2θUN + k (δ − θI0) cmax
.
(51)
Note that dWˆ (δ)dδ has two terms, and we compare these two
terms as follows. We compute the ratio between the two
terms’ squares as
(V cmax + θηUN)
(
bηV cmax+bη
2θUN−kθI0cmax
δ + kcmax
)
(V + ηU) kc2max
.
(52)
When δ ≤ δth = (V cmax+θηUN)(bη(V cmax+θηUN)−θI0cmaxk)kcmaxηU(cmax−θN)
and δ > 0, we can see that bηV cmax+bη2θUN−kθI0cmax >
0, and the ratio in (52) is strictly decreasing in δ. Moreover,
when δ = δth =
(V cmax+θηUN)(bη(V cmax+θηUN)−θI0cmaxk)
kcmaxηU(cmax−θN) ,
we can see that the ratio in (52) is 1. Therefore, when δ ≤ δth,
the ratio is no less than 1. Because it is the ratio between
the squares of the two terms in (51), we can conclude that
dWˆ (δ)
dδ ≤ 0 for δ ∈ (0, δth]. This implies that dW (δ)dδ ≤ 0 for
δ ∈ (0, δth].
Combing W (δth) = 0 and
dW (δ)
dδ ≤ 0 for δ ∈ (0, δth], we
can see that W (δ) ≥ 0 for δ ∈ (0, δth]. Since the expression
of W (δ) in (50) is the same as the expression of G (p0) in
(49), we have G (p0) ≥ 0 in Situation II.
(Step 4) Now we have proved that in Situation II,G (p) is
strictly decreasing in p ∈ [p0, p1), G (p1) ≤ 0, and G (p0) ≥
0. Note that G (p) is continuous in p ∈ [p0, p1]. It is easy
to see that there is a unique p satisfying p ∈ [p0, p1] and
G (p) = 0.
APPENDIX H
ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROPOSITIONS 5 AND 6 IN SEC-
TION 4.2
In Proposition 5, we summarize the venue’s POI decision
r∗ (l, p) and investment I∗ (l, p) in Stage II, under I0 ≤ Ith
and δ ≤ δth. In Proposition 6, we summarize the venue’s
7decisions under I0 > Ith. We illustrate the results in Fig. 13
and Fig. 14, respectively.
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Fig. 13: Situation II of Venue’s POI Decision r∗ and Investment I∗ in
Stage II.
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Fig. 14: Situation III of Venue’s POI Decision r∗ and Investment I∗ in
Stage II.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 IN SECTION 4.2
Proof. (Step 1) We can compute the venue’s optimal payoffs
in the following three decision regions: (i) r = 0; (ii) r = 1
and I ∈ [0, Ith − I0]; (iii) r = 1 and I ∈ (Ith − I0,∞). The
analysis is the same as that in the proof of Proposition 4.
Hence, we omit the detailed analysis, and simply reempha-
size the results here.
In decision region (i), the venue’s optimal payoff
is bNη Ucmax , and the optimal investment level is 0. In
decision region (ii), if p > p0, the venue’s optimal
payoff is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp,
and the optimal investment level is 0; if p ≤ p0,
the venue’s optimal payoff is Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p) =
bNη Ucmax − k (Ith − I0) −
(
l + pηUNcmax
)
, and the optimal
investment level is Ith − I0. In decision region (iii), if
p < p1, the venue’s optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0, and the
optimal investment level is Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k −
δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0. Furthermore, the venue’s optimal payoff is
greater than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). If p ≥ p1, the venue’s
optimal payoff is smaller than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p).
(Step 2) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strate-
gies under p < p0 ≤ p1. The venue’s optimal
payoff in region (i) is bNη Ucmax , its optimal pay-
off in region (ii) is Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p), and its
optimal payoff in region (iii) is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l+ kI0, which is
greater than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). Considering the three
decision regions, we conclude that if l ≤ − Ncmax bη2U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, the venue’s
optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) =
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0; otherwise, the
venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 3) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strate-
gies under p0 ≤ p < p2. The venue’s optimal pay-
off in region (i) is bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff in re-
gion (ii) is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp,
and its optimal payoff in region (iii) is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0. Accord-
ing to our proof of the uniqueness of p2, the function
G (p) =
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ p (53)
is 0 when p = p2, and is strictly decreasing in p ∈ [p0, p2].
Therefore, we have the following relation
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ p ≥ 0 (54)
for p ∈ [p0, p2]. This implies that the venue’s optimal
payoff in decision region (iii) is no less than its opti-
mal payoff in decision region (ii), and we only need
to compare the venue’s optimal payoffs in decision re-
gions (i) and (iii). We conclude that if l ≤ − Ncmax bη2U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, the venue’s
optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) =
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0; otherwise, the
venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 4) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strate-
gies under p2 ≤ p ≤ p1. The venue’s optimal pay-
off in region (i) is bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff in re-
gion (ii) is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) = bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp,
and its optimal payoff in region (iii) is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0. Accord-
ing to our proof of the uniqueness of p2, the function
G (p) =
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ p (55)
is 0 when p = p2, is strictly decreasing in p ∈ [p2, p1), and
is continuous at p = p1. Therefore, we have the following
relation
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0 +
V
δ
I0
− θ p ≤ 0 (56)
for p ∈ [p2, p1]. This implies that the venue’s optimal payoff
in decision region (iii) is no greater than its optimal payoff
in decision region (ii), and we only need to compare the
8venue’s optimal payoffs in decision regions (i) and (ii). We
conclude that if l ≤ − Vδ
I0
−θp, the venue’s optimal strategies
are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) = 0; otherwise, the venue’s
optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 5) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strategies
under p > p1 ≥ p0. The venue’s optimal payoff in deci-
sion region (i) is bNη Ucmax , its optimal payoff in decision
region (ii) is bNη Ucmax − l − VδI0−θp, which is greater than
Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p), and its optimal payoff in decision
region (iii) is smaller than Πvenue (1, Ith − I0, l, p). We con-
clude that if l ≤ − Vδ
I0
−θp, the venue’s optimal strategies
are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) = 0; otherwise, the venue’s
optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0 and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
Summarizing Step 2, Step 3, Step 4, and Step 5, we
derive the venue’s equilibrium strategies as follows
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p)) =
(0, 0) , if l>H2 (p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H2(p), p<p2,
(1, 0) , if l≤H2(p), p≥p2,
which is exactly (13).
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 IN SECTION 4.2
Proof. (Step 1) We compute the venue’s optimal payoffs in
the following two decision regions: (i) r = 0; (ii) r = 1 and
I ∈ [0,∞). In decision region (i), the venue’s optimal payoff
is bNη Ucmax , and the optimal investment level is 0.
Next, we analyze the venue’s optimal payoff in decision
region (ii) (i.e., r = 1 and I ∈ [0,∞)). In this decision region,
the venue’s payoff is given as
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) = −kI − l
+bN
(
η
U
cmax
+η
V cmax (I + I0)−ηUNδ+ηUNθ (I + I0)
c2max (I + I0) + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθ (I + I0)
)
−pN
(
η
U
cmax
+
V cmax (I + I0)−ηUNδ+ηUNθ (I + I0)
c2max (I + I0) + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθ (I + I0)
)
.
(57)
We can compute
∂Πvenue (1, I, l, p)
∂I
=
δN2 (bη − p) (V + ηU)
(δN + (I + I0)(cmax −Nθ))2
− k.
(58)
If p ≥ bη, Πvenue (1, I, l, p) decreases with
I for I ≥ 0. In this case, the venue’s optimal
payoff in decision region (ii) is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) =
bN
(
η Ucmax + η
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
− l −
pN
(
η Ucmax +
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
.
If p < bη, we can derive the relation ∂
2Πvenue(1,I,l,p)
∂I2 < 0.
Based on (58), the solution to ∂Π
venue(1,I,l,p)
∂I = 0 is
I = Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0. Hence,
when Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 > 0,
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) increases with I for 0 ≤ I ≤
N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0, and decreases
with I for I ≥ Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0.
Therefore, the venue’s optimal investment level in region
(ii) is Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0, and the
corresponding optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0.
When Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 ≤ 0,
Πvenue (1, I, l, p) decreases with I for I ≥ 0.
In this case, the venue’s optimal payoff in
decision region (ii) is Πvenue (1, 0, l, p) =
bN
(
η Ucmax + η
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
− l −
pN
(
η Ucmax +
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
.
Note that Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0 > 0
is equivalent to p < p3 = bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)
2
δ(V+ηU)N2 .
Therefore, we can summarize the venue’s optimal
payoff in decision region (ii) as follows. If p < p3,
the venue’s optimal payoff is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0, and
the optimal investment level is Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k −
δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0. If p ≥ p3, the venue’s optimal
payoff is bN
(
η Ucmax + η
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
− l −
pN
(
η Ucmax +
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
, and the optimal
investment level is 0.
(Step 2) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium
strategies under p < p3. The venue’s optimal
payoff in region (i) is bNη Ucmax , and its opti-
mal payoff in region (ii) is Ncmax bη (1− η)U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2 − l + kI0.
We conclude that if l ≤ − Ncmax bη2U +
N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − p)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, the
venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and
I∗ (l, p) = Ncmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k − δ Ncmax−Nθ−I0;
otherwise, the venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0
and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
(Step 3) We discuss the venue’s equilibrium strategies
under p ≥ p3. The venue’s optimal payoff in decision
region (i) is bNη Ucmax , and its optimal payoff in decision
region (ii) is bN
(
η Ucmax + η
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
− l −
pN
(
η Ucmax +
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
. We conclude that if
l ≤ (bη − p)N
(
V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
)
− pNη Ucmax , the
venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 1 and I∗ (l, p) = 0;
otherwise, the venue’s optimal strategies are r∗ (l, p) = 0
and I∗ (l, p) = 0.
Summarizing Step 2 and Step 3, we derive the venue’s
equilibrium strategies as follows
(r∗ (l, p) , I∗ (l, p)) =
(0, 0) , if l>H3(p),(
1, N
cmax−Nθ
√
δ(V+ηU)(bη−p)
k
− δN
cmax−Nθ−I0
)
, if l≤H3(p), p<p3,
(1, 0) , if l≤H3(p), p≥p3,
which is exactly (14).
9APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 IN SECTION 4.3
Proof. (Step 1) We prove that the venue’s payoff un-
der the optimal two-part tariff (l∗, p∗) is bNη Ucmax , i.e.,
Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) = bNη Ucmax .
First, when r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 0, the venue does not become a
POI under the optimal two-part tariff. In this case, we have
x¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗)) = η Ucmax based on Proposition 1.
The venue’s payoff is bNη Ucmax .
Second, when r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 1, the venue becomes
a POI under the optimal two-part tariff. We prove
Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) = bNη Ucmax by contra-
diction. If Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) < bNη Ucmax ,
the venue can switch its POI choice from 1 to 0, and achieve
a larger payoff (i.e., bNη Ucmax ). This violates the condition
r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 1. If Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) >
bNη Ucmax , the app can always increase its lump-sum fee to
extract more revenue from the venue, without changing the
venue’s POI choice and investment choice. For example, the
app can increase its lump-sum fee from l∗ to l∗ + ζ , where
ζ ∈
(
0,Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗)− bNη Ucmax
]
.
This violates the fact that l∗ is the app’s optimal lump-sum
fee.
Combing the case r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 0 and
case r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 1, we can easily see that
Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) = bNη Ucmax .
(Step 2) We compute the upper bound of Rapp (l∗, p∗).
Based on the definition of Πvenue (r, I, l, p), we have
Πvenue(r∗(l∗, p∗) , I∗(l∗, p∗) , l, p)=bNx¯ (r∗(l∗, p∗) , I∗(l∗, p∗))
−kI∗ (l∗, p∗)−r∗ (l∗, p∗) (l∗+p∗Ny¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))) .
(59)
As shown in Step 1, Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) =
bNη Ucmax . Hence, we have
r∗ (l∗, p∗) (l∗ + p∗Ny¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))) =
bNx¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))− kI∗ (l∗, p∗)− bNη U
cmax
.
(60)
Recall that the app’s optimal revenue is
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = φNy¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))
+ r∗ (l∗, p∗)
(
l∗ + p∗Ny¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))
)
. (61)
Based on (60), we can rewrite Rapp (l∗, p∗) as
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = φNy¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))− bNη U
cmax
+ bNx¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))− kI∗ (l∗, p∗) . (62)
The right-hand side of the above equation can be deter-
mined by r∗ (l∗, p∗) and I∗ (l∗, p∗). Therefore, we can com-
pute the upper bound of Rapp (l∗, p∗) as
Rapp (l∗, p∗) ≤ max
r∈{0,1},I≥0
φNy¯ (r, I) + bNx¯ (r, I)− kI
− bNη U
cmax
. (63)
Because y¯ (1, I) ≥ y¯ (0, I) and x¯ (1, I) ≥ x¯ (0, I), we have
φNy¯ (1, I) + bNx¯ (1, I) ≥ φNy¯ (0, I) + bNx¯ (0, I). Hence,
we have the following relation:
Rapp(l∗, p∗)≤max
I≥0
φNy¯ (1, I)+bNx¯ (1, I)−kI−bNη U
cmax
.
(64)
(Step 3) We show that if the app chooses
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
=(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
, its revenue achieves the upper bound
shown in (64). According to the definition of H˜ (p) and
Propositions 4, 5, and 6, the venue chooses r∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
= 1
when lˆ = H˜ (−φ) and pˆ = −φ. Furthermore, according to
Problem 2, the venue chooses I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
that satisfies
I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
= arg max
I≥0
φNy¯ (1, I) + bNx¯ (1, I)− kI. (65)
It is easy to compute that the venue’s payoff un-
der the tariff
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
=
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
is bNη Ucmax , i.e.,
Πvenue
(
r∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
, I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
, lˆ, pˆ
)
= bNη Ucmax . Based on the
approach we derive (59)-(62), the app’s revenue under the
tariff
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
can be written as
Rapp
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
=φNy¯
(
1, I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
))
+ bNx¯
(
1, I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
))
− kI∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
− bNη U
cmax
, (66)
where I∗
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
= arg maxI≥0 φNy¯ (1, I) + bNx¯ (1, I)− kI .
Comparing (66) with (64), we can see that Rapp
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
reaches the upper bound of the app’s revenue. This means
that
(
lˆ, pˆ
)
=
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
is the app’s optimal two-part
tariff.
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 IN SECTION 4.3
Proof. Since we will analyze the equilibrium outcomes (e.g.,
the venue’s payoff and the app’s revenue) under a general
(r, I)-dependent tariff scheme T that might not be a two-
part tariff scheme, we need to first introduce some new
notations. Specifically, we use Πvenueg (r, I, T ) to denote
the venue’s payoff under a general (r, I)-dependent tariff
scheme T (the subscript g stands for “general”). Similar as
(7), Πvenueg (r, I, T ) is given by
Πvenueg (r, I, T ) = bNx¯ (r, I)− kI − T. (67)
Note that the (r, I)-dependent tariff scheme T is a function
of r and I . As defined in Section 4.3, a feasible tariff scheme
T satisfies T = 0 when r = 0 (the venue does not become a
POI). Here, we use T rather than the function form T (r, I)
to simplify the expression.
We further use r∗g (T ) and I
∗
g (T ) to denote the venue’s
optimal POI and investment decisions under a general
(r, I)-dependent tariff scheme T . Then, we use Rappg (T ) to
denote the app’s revenue under T , which is given by
Rappg (T ) = T + φNy¯
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T )
)
. (68)
With these new notations, we are ready to introduce the
proof, which is actually similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
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(Step 1) We characterize the upper bound of Rappg (T )
under a general (r, I)-dependent tariff scheme T . From
(67) and (68), we can see that the summation of the app’s
revenue and venue’s payoff under T satisfies the following
relation:
Rappg (T ) + Π
venue
g
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T ) , T
)
=
bNx¯
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T )
)− kI∗g (T ) + φNy¯ (r∗g (T ) , I∗g (T )) .
(69)
When the venue does not become a POI and does not
invest, its payoff is always bNη Ucmax . Hence, the venue’s
optimal payoff under T is always no smaller than bNη Ucmax ,
i.e., Πvenueg
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T ) , T
) ≥ bNη Ucmax . Considering this
inequality and (69), we have the following inequality:
Rappg (T ) ≤bNx¯
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T )
)− kI∗g (T )
+ φNy¯
(
r∗g (T ) , I
∗
g (T )
)− bNη U
cmax
. (70)
The right-hand side of the above inequality can be deter-
mined by r∗g (T ) and I
∗
g (T ). Therefore, we can compute the
upper bound of Rappg (T ) as
Rappg (T ) ≤ max
r∈{0,1},I≥0
bNx¯ (r, I)−kI+φNy¯ (r, I)−bNη U
cmax
.
(71)
Because x¯ (1, I) ≥ x¯ (0, I) and y¯ (1, I) ≥ y¯ (0, I), we have
bNx¯ (1, I) + φNy¯ (1, I) ≥ bNx¯ (0, I) + φNy¯ (0, I). Hence,
we have the following relation:
Rappg (T ) ≤ max
I≥0
bNx¯ (1, I)− kI + φNy¯ (1, I)− bNη U
cmax
.
(72)
(Step 2) We show that if the app chooses Tˆ =
r
(
H˜ (−φ)− φNy¯ (r, I)
)
, i.e., our optimal two-part tariff
scheme introduced in Theorem 1, its revenue achieves
the upper bound in (72). Based on the proof of The-
orem 1, under the optimal two-part tariff scheme, (i)
the venue becomes a POI, i.e., r∗g
(
Tˆ
)
= 1; (ii) the
venue’s investment level I∗g
(
Tˆ
)
satisfies I∗g
(
Tˆ
)
=
arg maxI≥0bNx¯ (1, I) + φNy¯ (1, I) − kI ; (iii) the venue’s
optimal payoff Πvenueg
(
r∗g
(
Tˆ
)
, I∗g
(
Tˆ
)
, Tˆ
)
= bNη Ucmax .
Considering these results and (69), the app’s revenue under
Tˆ satisfies the following relation:
Rappg
(
Tˆ
)
=bNx¯
(
1, I∗g
(
Tˆ
))
− kI∗g
(
Tˆ
)
+ φNy¯
(
1, I∗g
(
Tˆ
))
− bNη U
cmax
, (73)
where I∗g
(
Tˆ
)
= arg maxI≥0bNx¯ (1, I) + φNy¯ (1, I) − kI .
Comparing (73) with (72), we can see that Rappg
(
Tˆ
)
achieves the upper bound of the app’s revenue un-
der any feasible (r, I)-dependent tariff scheme T . This
means that our optimal two-part tariff scheme Tˆ =
r
(
H˜ (−φ)− φNy¯ (r, I)
)
achieves the highest app’s rev-
enue among all feasible (r, I)-dependent tariff schemes.
APPENDIX M
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 IN SECTION 4.3
Proof. First, we prove that Rapp (l∗, p∗) = H˜ (−φ). Recall
that the app’s optimal revenue is
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = φNy¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))
+ r∗ (l∗, p∗)
(
l∗ + p∗Ny¯ (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗))
)
. (74)
Since (l∗, p∗) =
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
, we have l∗ = H˜ (p∗).
According to the definition of H˜ (p) and Propositions 4, 5,
and 6, we have r∗ (l∗, p∗) = 1. Hence, the app’s optimal
revenue is simplified as
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = (φ+ p∗)Ny¯ (1, I∗ (l∗, p∗)) + l∗. (75)
Because p∗ = −φ and l∗ = H˜ (−φ), we can see that
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = H˜ (−φ).
Second, we prove that Rapp (l∗, p∗) ≥ 0. Since (l∗, p∗) =(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
is the app’s optimal tariff, the relation
Rapp(l∗, p∗)=Rapp
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
≥Rapp
(
H˜ (−φ) + ,−φ
)
(76)
holds for any positive constant . Based on the defi-
nition of H˜ (p) and Propositions 4, 5, and 6, we have
Rapp
(
H˜ (−φ) + ,−φ
)
= 0. Considering (76), we have
Rapp (l∗, p∗) ≥ 0.
Third, we have already proved the result
Πvenue (r∗ (l∗, p∗) , I∗ (l∗, p∗) , l∗, p∗) = bNη Ucmax in Step 1
of the proof of Theorem 1 (in Section K).
APPENDIX N
PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 7, PROPOSITION 8, AND
COROLLARY 2
N.1 Proofs of Propositions 7 and 8 in Section 5.1
Proof. From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ > δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (98); when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (99); when
I0 > Ith, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (100). We can also easily
verify that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in U .
(Step 1) We analyze the monotonicity of the following
four functions of U .
A1 (U) ,
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0, (77)
A2 (U) ,φNη
U
cmax
− kIth + kI0, (78)
A3 (U) ,
V
δ
I0
− θφ, (79)
A4 (U) , (bη + φ)N
V cmaxI0 − ηUNδ + ηUNθI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
+ φNη
U
cmax
. (80)
Through simple computation, we can easily show that (i)
A1 (U) decreases with U for U ≤ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη , and in-
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creases with U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2− Vη ; (ii)A2 (U) increases
with U when I0 ≤ Ith and −φ ≤ p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN ; (iii)
A3 (U) does not change with U ; (iv) A4 (U) increases with
U when bηNθI0 + φcmaxI0 − bηNδ ≥ 0 and decreases with
U otherwise.
(Step 2) We prove Proposition 7, i.e., when δ ≤
(bηNθ+φcmax)I0
bηN , R
app (l∗, p∗) increases with U ∈ (0,∞).
First, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following regions:
(a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ < p1; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth,
and −φ < p2; (c) I0 > Ith and −φ < p3. In these regions,
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as A1 (U), which de-
creases with U for U ≤ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη , and increases with
U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη . Next, we show that when the
parameters’ values fall into region (a), region (b), or region
(c), we will have U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη , which implies that
Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in these regions.
In region (a), I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ < p1. In region
(b), I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth, and −φ < p2. Note that in region
(b), p2 ≤ p1. Hence, the relations I0 ≤ Ith and −φ < p1
hold for both region (a) and region (b). Since p1 = bη −
δk(V+ηU)c2max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 , we can rewrite the relation −φ < p1 as
−φ < bη − δk (V + ηU) c
2
max
(V cmax + θηUN)
2 . (81)
After arrangement, we can see that the following relation
holds for both region (a) and region (b):
δ <
(φ+ bη) (V cmax + θηUN)
2
k (V + ηU) c2max
. (82)
Next, we compare term (φ+bη)(V cmax+θηUN)
2
k(V+ηU)c2max
(i.e., the right-
hand side of (82)) with term
(ηU+V )(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2
k(bη+φ) . We compute
the ratio between them as
(φ+ bη) (V cmax + θηUN)
2
k (V + ηU) c2max
k (bη + φ)
(ηU + V )
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2
=
(φ+ bη)
2
(V + Uη)
2
(V cmax + UθηN)
2
(φcmax + bθηN)
2
=
(
φV cmax + bη
2UθN + V bηcmax + φUηθN
φV cmax + bη2UθN + V bηθN + φUηcmax
)2
. (83)
Based on I0 ≤ Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN (i.e., a relation that holds
for region (a) and region (b)) and δ ≤ (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN (i.e.,
the condition of Proposition 7), we can derive the relation
δ
θ+φcmaxbηN
≤ δ
θ+V cmaxηUN
, which implies φU ≥ bV . Considering
cmax − θN > 0 (according to our assumption in Section
3), we further have φU (cmax − θN) η ≥ bV (cmax − θN) η.
After arrangement, we obtain the following relation:
φUηcmax + V bηθN ≥ V bηcmax + φUηθN. (84)
Based on the above relation, we can see that the ratio in (83)
is no larger than 1. Considering (82), we have
δ <
(φ+ bη) (V cmax + θηUN)
2
k (V + ηU) c2max
≤
(ηU + V )
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2
k (bη + φ)
.
(85)
After arrangement, we can see the following relation holds
for region (a) and region (b):
U ≥ δk (bη + φ)
η
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2 − Vη . (86)
Recall thatA1 (U) increases with U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2− Vη .
Hence, revenue Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in region (a)
and region (b).
In region (c), I0 > Ith and −φ < p3. We can rewrite the
relation −φ < p3 as
−φ < bη − k ((cmax − θN) I0 + δN)
2
δ (V + ηU)N2
. (87)
After arrangement, we have the following relation
U >
k ((cmax − θN) I0 + δN)2
η (φ+ bη) δN2
− V
η
. (88)
Since δ ≤ (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN (the condition of Proposition 7),
we can see that the following relation holds for region (c)
U >
δk (bη + φ)
η
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2 − Vη . (89)
Recall thatA1 (U) increases with U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2− Vη .
Hence, revenue Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in region (c).
Second, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following re-
gion: I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0. In this region,
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as A2 (U). Recall that
A2 (U) increases with U when I0 ≤ Ith and −φ ≤ p0. We
can see that Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in this region.
Third, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following regions:
(a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ > p0, and (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth,
and −φ ≥ p2. In these regions, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is
the same as A3 (U), which does not change with U .
Fourth, we considerRapp (l∗, p∗) in the following region:
I0 > Ith and −φ ≥ p3. In this region, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expres-
sion is the same as A4 (U), which increases with U when
bηNθI0 + φcmaxI0 − bηNδ ≥ 0. Recall that the condition
of Proposition 7 is δ ≤ (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN . We can see that
Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in the region I0 > Ith and
−φ ≥ p3.
Considering the analysis for all the above regions and
the fact that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in U , we complete
the proof of Proposition 7.
(Step 3) We prove Proposition 8, i.e., when δ >
(bηNθ+φcmax)I0
bηN , R
app (l∗, p∗) decreases with U for U ≤
δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2− Vη , and increases with U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)η(Nθbηcmax +φ)2
−
V
η .
First, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following regions:
(a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ < p1; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth,
and −φ < p2; (c) I0 > Ith and −φ < p3. In these regions,
12
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as A1 (U), which de-
creases with U for U ≤ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη , and increases with
U for U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη .
Second, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following re-
gion: I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0. In this region,
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as A2 (U). Recall that
A2 (U) increases with U when I0 ≤ Ith and −φ ≤ p0. We
can see that Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U in this region.
Next, we prove that the relation U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη holds
in this region. Note that p1 ≤ −φ and −φ ≤ p0 imply that
bη − δk (V + ηU) c
2
max
(V cmax + θηUN)
2 ≤ −φ ≤ −k
(δ − θI0) cmax
V cmax + θηUN
.
(90)
After arrangement, we have the following two inequalities:
U ≥ (φ+ bη) (V cmax + θηUN)
2
δkc2maxη
− V
η
, (91)
(V cmax + θηUN)
2 ≥ k
2c2max (δ − θI0)2
φ2
. (92)
Then we can easily derive the following inequality:
U ≥ (φ+ bη) k (δ − θI0)
2
δηφ2
− V
η
. (93)
Based on δ > (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN (the condition of Proposition
8), we can obtain
U ≥ δk (bη + φ)
η
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2 − Vη . (94)
Hence, we have shown that in the region I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth,
and p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0, Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with U , and U
satisfies U ≥ δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη .
Third, we consider Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following regions:
(a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ > p0, and (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth,
and −φ ≥ p2. In these regions, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is
the same as A3 (U), which does not change with U .
Fourth, we considerRapp (l∗, p∗) in the following region:
I0 > Ith and −φ ≥ p3. In this region, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expres-
sion is the same as A4 (U), which decreases with U when
bηNθI0 + φcmaxI0 − bηNδ < 0. Recall that the condition
of Proposition 8 is δ > (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN . We can see that
Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with U in this region. Next, we show
that the relation U < δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη holds in this region.
We can rewrite −φ ≥ p3 as
−φ ≥ bη − k ((cmax − θN) I0 + δN)
2
δ (V + ηU)N2
. (95)
After arrangement, we obtain the following relation:
U ≤ k ((cmax − θN) I0 + δN)
2
η (φ+ bη) δN2
− V
η
. (96)
Since δ > (bηNθ+φcmax)I0bηN (the condition of Proposition 8),
we can see that the following relation holds in this region:
U <
δk (bη + φ)
η
(
Nθbη
cmax
+ φ
)2 − Vη . (97)
Hence, we have shown that in the region I0 > Ith and
−φ ≥ p3, Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with U , and U satisfies
U < δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη .
Considering the analysis for all the above regions and
the fact that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in U , we complete
the proof of Proposition 8.
N.2 Proof of Corollary 2 in Section 5.1
Proof. The proof is very straightforward. Based on Propo-
sition 8, when δ > φcmaxI0bηN + θI0, R
app (l∗, p∗) decreases
with U for U ∈
(
0, δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη
]
. Moreover, when
δ >
(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2
(ηcmax+(1−η)V−ηθN)
k(bη+φ) , we can easily see that
δk(bη+φ)
η(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2 − Vη > cmax − V − θN . Therefore, when
δ > max
{
φcmaxI0
bηN + θI0,
(Nθbηcmax +φ)
2
(ηcmax+(1−η)V−ηθN)
k(bη+φ)
}
,
we can conclude that Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with U for
U ∈ (0, cmax − V − θN).
APPENDIX O
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9 IN SECTION 5.2
Proof. From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ > δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (98); when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (99); when
I0 > Ith, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (100). We can also easily
verify that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in η.
(Step 1) We study the impact of η on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in
the following situations: (a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ >
p0; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth, and −φ ≥ p2. In these situations,
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is Vδ
I0
−θφ, which is independent of
η.
(Step 2) We study the impact of η on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the
following situation: I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0.
In this situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as the
following function:
B1 (η) ,φNη
U
cmax
− kIth + kI0. (101)
From the definition of Ith, we have Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN
. By
taking the derivative ofB1 (η) with respect to η and utilizing
the conditions −φ ≤ p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN and I0 ≤ Ith, we
can easily prove that dB1(η)dη ≥ 0. Hence, in the considered
situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with η.
(Step 3) We assume that φ ≥ bVU , and study the impact
of η on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following situations: (a) I0 ≤ Ith,
δ > δth, and −φ < p1; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth, and −φ < p2;
(c) I0 > Ith and −φ < p3. In these situations, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s
expression is the same as the following function:
B2 (η) ,
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0. (102)
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
− N
cmax
bη2U + N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if − φ < p1,
φNη U
cmax
− kIth + kI0, if p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0,
V
δ
I0
−θφ, if − φ > p0.
(98)
 −
N
cmax
bη2U + N
cmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if − φ < p2,
V
δ
I0
−θφ, if − φ ≥ p2.
(99)
 − Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−√δk
)2
+ kI0, if − φ < p3,
(bη + φ)N V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0
c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0
+ φNη U
cmax
, if − φ ≥ p3.
(100)
We compute dB2(η)dη as
dB2 (η)
dη
= −2bUη N
cmax
+
N
cmax−Nθ (bV +2bηU+Uφ)
(
1−
√
δk
(bη + φ) (V + ηU)
)
.
(103)
In situations (a), (b), and (c), we can prove that the condition
−φ < bη − δk(V+ηU)c2max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 always holds. Hence, in these
situations, we have 1 −
√
δk
(bη+φ)(V+ηU) >
cmaxηU−θNηU
V cmax+cmaxηU
>
0. Then, we can obtain the following relation:
dB2 (η)
dη
> −2bUη N
cmax
+
N
cmax −Nθ (bV + 2bηU + Uφ)
cmaxηU − θNηU
V cmax + cmaxηU
.
(104)
Based on φ ≥ bVU (the assumption of Step 3), we further
have the following relation:
dB2 (η)
dη
>−2bUη N
cmax
+
2bN (V +ηU)
cmax−Nθ
cmaxηU−θNηU
V cmax+cmaxηU
=0. (105)
Therefore, when φ ≥ bVU , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with η in
the considered situations.
(Step 4) We assume that φ ≥ bVU , and study the impact
of η on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the situation I0 > Ith and −φ ≥ p3.
In this situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as the
following function:
B3 (η) , (bη + φ)N
V cmaxI0 − ηUNδ + ηUNθI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
+ φNη
U
cmax
. (106)
When δ ≤ θI0, we can easily see thatB3 (η) increases with η.
Next, we focus on the case where δ > θI0. We can compute
dB3(η)
dη as follows:
dB3 (η)
dη
=
(bV + φU) cmaxI0 − 2bηUN (δ − θI0)
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
N. (107)
From I0 > Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN
, we have the relation η <
V cmaxI0
UN(δ−θI0) . Hence, we can see that
dB3 (η)
dη
>
φUcmaxI0 − bV cmaxI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
N. (108)
From the assumption φ ≥ bVU , we can see that dB3(η)dη > 0.
Combing the results of the case δ ≤ θI0 and the case δ >
θI0, we can see that when φ ≥ bVU , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases
with η in the considered situation.
According to the fact that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in
η and the results in Step 1, Step 2, Step 3, and Step 4, we
conclude that when φ ≥ bVU , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with
η.
APPENDIX P
PROOF OF LEMMA 2 IN SECTION 5.2
Proof. We define functionE (δ) , δ2−2θI0δ− bV 2kU δ+θ2I20 . It
is easy to show that (a) E (δ) is continuous in δ ∈ (−∞,∞);
(b) E (δ) strictly decreases in δ ∈
(
−∞, θI0 + bV 22kU
)
; (c)
E (δ) strictly convexly increases in δ ∈
(
θI0 +
bV 2
2kU ,∞
)
with d
2E(δ)
dδ2 = 2. Moreover, we can verify thatE (δ) |δ=θI0 <
0. Hence, we can see that there is a unique δ ∈ (θI0,∞) that
satisfies E (δ) = 0.
APPENDIX Q
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10 IN SECTION 5.2
Proof. (Step 1) We show that when δ > δ2, φ < bVU , and
η < V cmaxI0UN(δ−θI0) , we have −φ ≥ bη −
k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2
δ(V+ηU)N2 .
We prove it by contradiction, i.e., we assume that when
δ > δ2, φ < bVU , and η <
V cmaxI0
UN(δ−θI0) , we have −φ <
bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2δ(V+ηU)N2 .
Rearranging −φ < bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2δ(V+ηU)N2 , we obtain
the following relation:
k ((cmax−θN) I0 + δN)2<(φ+ bη) δ (V + ηU)N2. (109)
From the condition φ < bVU , we further have the following
relation:
k ((cmax − θN) I0 + δN)2 < b
U
δ (V + ηU)
2
N2. (110)
Considering the condition η < V cmaxI0UN(δ−θI0) , we further have
the following relation:
k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2< b
U
δ
(
N (δ−θI0)+cmaxI0
N (δ−θI0)
)2
V 2N2.
(111)
After the rearrangement of the above inequality, we obtain
the following result:
δ2 − 2θI0δ − bV
2
kU
δ + θ2I20 < 0. (112)
14
Based on Lemma 2, we have δ22−2θI0δ2− bV
2
kU δ2+θ
2I20 =
0. Moreover, it is easy to show that δ2−2θI0δ− bV 2kU δ+θ2I20
strictly increases with δ in δ ∈ [δ2,∞). Hence, when δ >
δ2, we have the relation δ2 − 2θI0δ − bV 2kU δ + θ2I20 > 0.
This contradicts with (112). Therefore, we can conclude that
when δ > δ2, φ < bVU , and η <
V cmaxI0
UN(δ−θI0) , we have −φ ≥
bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2δ(V+ηU)N2 .
(Step 2) We show that when φ < bVU and δ > δ2, we
have the relation ηA < ηB . When δ > δ2 > θI0, we can
see that ηA =
(bV+φU)cmaxI0
2bUN(δ−θI0) > 0 and ηB =
V cmaxI0
UN(δ−θI0) > 0.
Moreover, we can compute the ratio between ηA and ηB as
ηA
ηB
= bV+φU2bV , which is smaller than 1 under the condition
φ < bVU . Hence, when φ <
bV
U and δ > δ2, we have the
relation ηA < ηB .
(Step 3) We show that when φ < bVU and δ > δ2,
Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with η for η ∈ (ηA, ηB).
Based on our result in Step 1, when δ > δ2, φ <
bV
U , and η < ηB =
V cmaxI0
UN(δ−θI0) , we have −φ ≥ bη −
k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2
δ(V+ηU)N2 = p3. Moreover, when δ > δ2, we can
rearrange the relation η < V cmaxI0UN(δ−θI0) to obtain the relation
I0 >
δ
θ+V cmaxηUN
= Ith. According to Theorem 1 and Corollary
1, under −φ ≥ p3 and I0 > Ith, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is
given as follows:
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = (bη + φ)N
V cmaxI0 − ηUNδ + ηUNθI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
+ φNη
U
cmax
. (113)
Based on our computation in Step 4 in Section O,
the above Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s derivative with respective to
η is (bV+φU)cmaxI0−2bηUN(δ−θI0)c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0 N . When η > ηA =
(bV+φU)cmaxI0
2bUN(δ−θI0) , we can easily see that such a derivative
is negative. That is to say, when φ < bVU , δ > δ2, and
ηA < η < ηB , Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with η.
APPENDIX R
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11 IN SECTION 5.3
Proof. From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ > δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (98); when
I0 ≤ Ith and δ ≤ δth, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (99); when
I0 > Ith, Rapp (l∗, p∗) is given in (100). We can also easily
verify that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in N .
(Step 1) We study the impact of N on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in
the following situations: (a) I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and −φ >
p0; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth, and −φ ≥ p2. In these situations,
Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is Vδ
I0
−θφ, which is independent of
N .
(Step 2) We study the impact of N on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the
following situation: I0 ≤ Ith, δ > δth, and p1 ≤ −φ ≤ p0.
In this situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as the
following function:
C1 (N) ,φNη
U
cmax
− kIth + kI0. (114)
From the definition of Ith, we have Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN
. By
taking the derivative of C1 (N) with respect to N and
utilizing the conditions −φ ≤ p0 = −k (δ−θI0)cmaxV cmax+θηUN and
I0 ≤ Ith, we can easily prove that dC1(N)dN ≥ 0. Hence, in the
considered situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with N .
(Step 3) We assume that φ ≥ bVU , and study the impact of
N on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the following situations: (a) I0 ≤ Ith,
δ > δth, and −φ < p1; (b) I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth, and −φ < p2;
(c) I0 > Ith and −φ < p3. In these situations, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s
expression is the same as the following function:
C2 (N) ,
N
cmax −Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη + φ)−
√
δk
)2
− N
cmax
bη2U + kI0. (115)
We compute dC2(N)dN as
dC2(N)
dN
=
c2max
(√
(V + ηU)(bη + φ)−√δk
)2
−bη2U (cmax−Nθ)2
(cmax −Nθ)2 cmax
.
(116)
In situations (a), (b), and (c), we can prove that the condition
−φ < bη − δk(V+ηU)c2max
(V cmax+θηUN)
2 always holds. Hence, in these
situations, we have δ < (bη+φ)(V cmax+θηUN)
2
k(V+ηU)c2max
. Furthermore,
we have the following relation:√
(V +ηU)(bη+φ)−
√
δk>
√
bη+φ
V +ηU
ηU
(
1− θN
cmax
)
>0.
(117)
The first inequality is based on δ < (bη+φ)(V cmax+θηUN)
2
k(V+ηU)c2max
,
and the second inequality is based on the assumption
cmax > θN + U + V (made in Section 3.4). According to
(117), we can see that dC2(N)dN in (116) decreases with δ.
By utilizing the relation δ < (bη+φ)(V cmax+θηUN)
2
k(V+ηU)c2max
, we can
obtain the following relation:
dC2 (N)
dN
>
φU − bV
(V + ηU) cmax
η2U. (118)
Recall that we assume φ ≥ bVU in Step 3. Hence, we have
dC2(N)
dN > 0. This implies that when φ ≥ bVU , Rapp (l∗, p∗)
increases with N in the considered situations.
(Step 4) We assume that φ ≥ bVU , and study the impact
of N on Rapp (l∗, p∗) in the situation I0 > Ith and −φ ≥ p3.
In this situation, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is the same as the
following function:
C3 (N) , (bη + φ)N
V cmaxI0 − ηUNδ + ηUNθI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
+ φNη
U
cmax
. (119)
We can compute dC3(N)dN as (120).
When δ ≤ θI0, we can utilize the relation cmax > θN +
U + V (our assumption made in Section 3.4) to verify that
dC3(N)
dN > 0. Next, we focus on the case where δ > θI0. We
define function Cˆ3 (N) as (121).
Note that Cˆ3 (N) is actually the numerator of
dC3(N)
dN .
Rearranging I0 > Ith = δθ+V cmaxηUN
and utilizing the con-
dition δ > θI0, we obtain the relation N < V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) .
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dC3 (N)
dN
=
bηcmax
(
V c2maxI
2
0 + 2cmaxI0ηUN (θI0 − δ)− ηUN2 (δ − θI0)2
)
+ φ (ηU + V ) c3maxI
2
0
(c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0)2
. (120)
Cˆ3 (N) , bηcmax
(
V c2maxI
2
0 + 2cmaxI0ηUN (θI0 − δ)− ηUN2 (δ − θI0)2
)
+ φ (ηU + V ) c3maxI
2
0 . (121)
We can easily see that Cˆ3 (N) is a quadratic function of
N , and decreases in N ∈
(
0, V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0)
]
. Therefore, under
0 < N < V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) , the following result holds:
Cˆ3 (N)>Cˆ3 (N) |N= V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) =(ηU+V ) c
3
maxI
2
0
(
φ− bV
U
)
.
(122)
Recall that we assume that φ ≥ bVU holds in Step 4. Hence,
we have Cˆ3 (N) > 0, which implies that
dC3(N)
dN > 0. Now
we have proved that dC3(N)dN > 0 holds for both the case
δ ≤ θI0 and the case δ > θI0. We can see that when φ ≥ bVU ,
Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with N in the considered situation.
According to the fact that Rapp (l∗, p∗) is continuous in
N and the results in Step 1, Step 2, Step 3, and Step 4,
we conclude that when φ ≥ bVU , Rapp (l∗, p∗) increases with
N .
APPENDIX S
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 3 AND 4
S.1 Proof of Lemma 3 in Section 5.3
Proof. We define function L (δ) , δ2 − 2θI0δ− V
2(bη+φ)
k(V+ηU) δ+
θ2I20 . It is easy to show that (a) L (δ) is continuous
in δ ∈ (−∞,∞); (b) L (δ) strictly decreases in δ ∈(
−∞, θI0 + V
2(bη+φ)
2k(V+ηU)
)
; (c) L (δ) strictly convexly increases
in δ ∈
(
θI0 +
V 2(bη+φ)
2k(V+ηU) ,∞
)
with d
2L(δ)
dδ2 = 2. Moreover, we
can verify that L (δ) |δ=θI0 < 0. Hence, we can see that there
is a unique δ ∈ (θI0,∞) that satisfies L (δ) = 0.
S.2 Proof of Lemma 4 in Section 5.3
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Proposition 11 in Section
R, we have defined a function Cˆ3 (N), which has the same
expression as the left-hand side of the following equation:
− bη2cmaxU (δ − θI0)2N2 + 2bη2c2maxI0U (θI0 − δ)N
+ bηc3maxI
2
0V + φ (ηU + V ) c
3
maxI
2
0 = 0. (123)
We can easily see that Cˆ3 (N) is a continuous function, and
strictly decreases in N ∈
(
− cmaxI0δ−θI0 ,∞
)
. When δ > δ3, we
can utilize δ3 > θI0 to prove that δ > θI0. This implies the
relation − cmaxI0δ−θI0 ≤ 0 ≤ V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) . Hence, Cˆ3 (N) strictly
decreases in N ∈
(
0, V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0)
)
. Next, we investigate
Cˆ3 (N)’s values at points N = 0 and N = V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) .
We can see that Cˆ3 (N) |N=0 = bηc3maxI20V +
φ (ηU + V ) c3maxI
2
0 > 0. Moreover, when φ <
bV
U , we can
verify that
Cˆ3 (N) |N= V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) = (ηU + V ) c
3
maxI
2
0
(
φ− bV
U
)
< 0.
(124)
Recall that Cˆ3 (N) is continuous, and strictly decreases in
N ∈
(
0, V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0)
)
. We can conclude that when φ < bVU
and δ > δ3, there is a unique N ∈
(
0, V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0)
)
that
satisfies Cˆ3 (N) = 0.
APPENDIX T
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12 IN SECTION 5.3
Proof. (Step 1) We show that when δ > δ3, φ < bVU , and
N < NB , we have −φ ≥ bη− k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)
2
δ(V+ηU)N2 . We prove
it by contradiction, i.e., we assume that when δ > δ3, φ <
bV
U , and N < NB , we have −φ < bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)
2
δ(V+ηU)N2 .
Rearranging −φ < bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2δ(V+ηU)N2 , we obtain
the following relation:(
k (δ − θI0)2 − δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU)
)
N2
+ 2k (δ − θI0) cmaxI0N + kc2maxI20 < 0. (125)
We define function M (N) as the left-hand side of the above
inequality:
M (N) ,
(
k (δ − θI0)2 − δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU)
)
N2
+ 2k (δ − θI0) cmaxI0N + kc2maxI20 . (126)
Next, we discuss the case k (δ − θI0)2 −
δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) ≥ 0 and the case k (δ − θI0)2 −
δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) < 0, separately.
First, if k (δ − θI0)2 − δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) ≥ 0, we can
utilize the relations δ > δ3 and δ3 > θI0 to verify thatM (N)
increases in N ∈ [0,∞). We can also see that M (N) |N=0 =
kc2maxI
2
0 ≥ 0. Therefore, when N < NB = V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) and
N > 0 (based on N ’s definition, N is positive), we have the
relation M (N) ≥ 0, which contradicts with (125).
Second, if k (δ − θI0)2 − δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) < 0, we
can utilize the relations δ > δ3 and δ3 > θI0 to ver-
ify that M (N) is a unimodal function, and M (N) ≥
min {M (N) |N=0,M (N) |N=NB} for any N ∈ (0, NB). It
is easy to see that M (N) |N=0 = kc2maxI20 ≥ 0. Next, we
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investigate the relation between M (N) |N=NB and zero.
From NB = V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) , we can compute M (N) |N=NB as
M (N) |N=NB =
c2maxI
2
0
η2U2 (δ−θI0)2
(V +ηU)
(
(δ−θI0)2 k (V +ηU)−δ (bη+φ)V 2
)
.
(127)
Based on Lemma 3, we have δ23 − 2θI0δ3 − V
2(bη+φ)
k(V+ηU) δ3 +
θ2I20 = 0. Moreover, it is easy to show that δ
2 −
2θI0δ − V
2(bη+φ)
k(V+ηU) δ + θ
2I20 strictly increases with δ in
δ ∈ [δ3,∞). Hence, when δ > δ3, we have the re-
lation δ2 − 2θI0δ − V
2(bη+φ)
k(V+ηU) δ + θ
2I20 > 0. After rear-
rangement, we have the relation k (V + ηU) (δ − θI0)2 −
V 2 (bη + φ)δ > 0. Then, we can easily see that
M (N) |N=NB in (127) is non-negative. Based on the re-
sults M (N) ≥ min {M (N) |N=0,M (N) |N=NB} for any
N ∈ (0, NB), M (N) |N=0 ≥ 0, and M (N) |N=NB ≥ 0, we
can obtain the relation M (N) ≥ 0, which contradicts with
(125).
Combining the discussions for the case k (δ − θI0)2 −
δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) ≥ 0 and the case k (δ − θI0)2 −
δ (bη + φ) (V + ηU) < 0, we can see that when δ > δ3, φ <
bV
U , and N < NB , we have −φ ≥ bη − k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)
2
δ(V+ηU)N2 .
(Step 2) We show that when φ < bVU and δ > δ3,
Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with N for N ∈ (NA, NB).
Based on our result in Step 1, when δ > δ3, φ <
bV
U , and N < NB =
V cmaxI0
ηU(δ−θI0) , we have −φ ≥ bη −
k((cmax−θN)I0+δN)2
δ(V+ηU)N2 = p3. Moreover, when δ > δ3, we can
rearrange the relation N < V cmaxI0ηU(δ−θI0) to obtain the relation
I0 >
δ
θ+V cmaxηUN
= Ith. According to Theorem 1 and Corollary
1, under −φ ≥ p3 and I0 > Ith, Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s expression is
given as follows:
Rapp (l∗, p∗) = (bη + φ)N
V cmaxI0 − ηUNδ + ηUNθI0
c2maxI0 + cmaxNδ − cmaxNθI0
+ φNη
U
cmax
. (128)
Based on our computation in Step 4 in Section R,
the above Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s derivative with respective to N is
bηcmax(V c2maxI
2
0+2cmaxI0ηUN(θI0−δ)−ηUN2(δ−θI0)2)+φ(ηU+V )c3maxI20
(c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0)2
.
Note that the numerator’s expression is the same as Cˆ3 (N),
where Cˆ3 (N) is studied in our proof of Lemma 4 in
Section S.2. Based on Section S.2, we can show that when
δ > δ3 and φ < bVU , function Cˆ3 (N) strictly decreases in
N ∈
[
NA,
V cmaxI0
ηU(δ−θI0)
)
. Moreover, from the definition of NA,
we have the relation Cˆ3 (N) |N=NA = 0. Therefore, when
N > NA, we have Cˆ3 (N) < 0. This means Rapp (l∗, p∗)’s
derivative with respective to N is negative. That is to say,
when φ < bVU , δ > δ3, and NA < N < NB , R
app (l∗, p∗)
decreases with N .
APPENDIX U
PROOF OF THEOREM 3 IN SECTION 6
Proof. The app’s expected utility Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp (lu, pu)
)}
has
different expressions in situation I0 > Ith, situation I0 ≤
Ith, δ > δth, and situation I0 ≤ Ith, δ ≤ δth. To simplify
the presentation, we focus on the proof of Theorem 3 in
situation I0 > Ith. The proofs of Theorem 3 in the remaining
two situations are similar and hence are omitted here.
(Step 1) We prove that we only need to focus on (lu, pu)
with lu = H˜ (pu) to determine the optimal tariff. First, for
any (lu, pu) with lu < H˜ (pu), the app can always increase
the lump-sum fee lu to H˜ (pu) to improve its expected utility
without changing the venue’s POI and investment choices.
Second, under any (lu, pu) with lu > H˜ (pu), the venue does
not become a POI, and the app’s expected utility is J (0).
Under p′u = 0 and l
′
u = H˜ (p
′
u) = H˜ (0), the app’s revenue
is
Rapp (l′u, p
′
u) = H˜ (0) + φNy¯ (r
∗ (l′u, p
′
u) , I
∗ (l′u, p
′
u)) .
(129)
In Corollary 1, we have shown that H˜ (−φ) ≥ 0 for any
φ ≥ 0. Hence, it is easy to see that H˜ (0) ≥ 0. Since function
y¯ (·, ·) is the fraction of users interacting with the POI, we
have y¯ (r∗ (l′u, p
′
u) , I
∗ (l′u, p
′
u)) ≥ 0. Therefore, we can see
that Rapp (l′u, p
′
u) ≥ 0.
Since J ′ (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ R, we have the relation
Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp (l′u, p
′
u)
)} ≥ J (0). This implies that (l′u, p′u),
which satisfies l′u = H˜ (p
′
u), achieves at least the same app’s
expected utility as all (lu, pu) with lu > H˜ (pu). Therefore,
we can see that we only need to focus on (lu, pu) with lu =
H˜ (pu) to determine the optimal tariff.
(Step 2) We show Rapp (lu, pu)’s concrete expres-
sion under lu = H˜ (pu) and I0 > Ith, and compute
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
. Recall that when lu = H˜ (pu), we
can write Rapp (lu, pu) as
Rapp (lu, pu) = H˜ (pu) + (φ+ pu)Ny¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
))
.
(130)
According to the concrete expressions of H˜ (pu) and
y¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
))
under I0 > Ith, we show
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
)
as (131).
We can verify that Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
)
is continuous for
pu ∈ (−∞,∞). Furthermore, when pu < p3, we compute
dRapp
(
H˜ (pu), pu
)
dpu
=−1
2
N
√
kδ (V +ηU)
cmax −Nθ (φ+pu) (bη−pu)
− 32 ;
(133)
when pu ≥ p3, Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
)
does not change with pu.
We define O (pu, φ) as (132). Function O (pu, φ) has the
same expression as Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
)
(under the same pu
and φ). We use function O (pu, φ) to capture the dependence
of the expression’s value on φ.
When pu < p3, we can compute
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
17
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
)
=− Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − pu)−
√
δk
)2
+ kI0 +
(φ+pu)N
cmax−Nθ
(
ηU + V −
√
kδ(V+ηU)
bη−pu
)
, if pu < p3,
(bη + φ)N V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0 + φNη
U
cmax
, if pu ≥ p3.
(131)
O (pu, φ) ,− Ncmax bη2U + Ncmax−Nθ
(√
(V + ηU) (bη − pu)−
√
δk
)2
+ kI0 +
(φ+pu)N
cmax−Nθ
(
ηU + V −
√
kδ(V+ηU)
bη−pu
)
, if pu < p3,
(bη + φ)N V cmaxI0−ηUNδ+ηUNθI0c2maxI0+cmaxNδ−cmaxNθI0 + φNη
U
cmax
, if pu ≥ p3.
(132)
as
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
dpu
=
− 1
2
N
√
kδ(V +ηU)
cmax −Nθ (bη−pu)
− 3
2 ·
∫ φmax
φmin
J ′
(
O(pu, φ)
)
(φ+pu)dF (φ) ,
(134)
where F (φ) is the cumulative distribution function of φ.
When pu ≥ p3,
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
= 0.
(Step 3) We prove that for any utility function J (z), we
only need to consider pu ∈ [−φmax,−φmin] to determine the
optimal p∗u.
First, when pu < −φmax and pu < p3, we have
φ + pu < 0 for all φ ∈ [φmin, φmax]. Recall that
J ′ (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ (−∞,∞). Based on (134), we
have
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
≥ 0. When pu < −φmax
and pu ≥ p3,
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
= 0. We can see
that Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is increasing in pu ∈
(−∞,−φmax).
Second, when pu > −φmin and pu < p3, we have
φ + pu > 0 for all φ ∈ [φmin, φmax]. Recall that
J ′ (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ (−∞,∞). Based on (134), we
have
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
≤ 0. When pu > −φmin
and pu ≥ p3,
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
= 0. We can see
that Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is decreasing in pu ∈
(−φmin,∞).
Combining the analysis above, we show that we only
need to consider pu ∈ [−φmax,−φmin] to determine the
optimal p∗u.
(Step 4) We prove that when J ′′ (z) ≤ 0 for z ∈
(−∞,∞), Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is increasing in pu ∈
[−φmax,−E {φ}].
As we can see in (134), the sign of
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
under pu < p3 is mainly affected
by the sign of
∫ φmax
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ). Next,
we analyze
∫ φmax
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ). When
pu ∈ [−φmax,−φmin], we have∫ φmax
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ) =∫ −pu
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
+
∫ φmax
−pu
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ) . (135)
When φ ∈ [φmin,−pu], we have φ + pu ≤ 0. Moreover,
it is easy to verify that O (pu, φ) is increasing in φ. Hence,
we have O (pu, φ) ≤ O (pu,−pu). Because J ′′ (z) ≤ 0 for
z ∈ (−∞,∞), we have J ′(O (pu, φ) ) ≥ J ′(O (pu,−pu) ).
Then, we have the relation∫ −pu
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
≤
∫ −pu
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ) . (136)
When φ ∈ [−pu, φmax], we have φ + pu ≥ 0. Moreover,
we have O (pu, φ) ≥ O (pu,−pu). Because J ′′ (z) ≤ 0 for
z ∈ (−∞,∞), we have J ′(O (pu, φ) ) ≤ J ′(O (pu,−pu) ).
Then, we have the relation∫ φmax
−pu
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
≤
∫ φmax
−pu
J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ) . (137)
Based on (135), (136), and (137), we can derive the following
result: ∫ φmax
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
≤
∫ −pu
φmin
J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
+
∫ φmax
−pu
J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
=J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
) ∫ φmax
φmin
(φ+ pu) dF (φ)
=J ′
(
O (pu,−pu)
)
(pu + E {φ}) . (138)
We can see that if pu ≤ −E {φ},
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φmin
J ′
(
O (pu, φ)
)
(φ+ pu) dF (φ) ≤ 0. Considering
the analysis of
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
in Step 2, we
conclude that if pu ≤ −E {φ},
dEφ
{
J
(
Rapp(H˜(pu),pu)
)}
dpu
≥ 0.
Therefore, we have proved that when J ′′ (z) ≤ 0 for
z ∈ (−∞,∞), Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is increasing in
pu ∈ [−φmax,−E {φ}].
(Step 5) Based on similar approaches as Step 4,
we can prove that when J ′′ (z) ≥ 0 for z ∈
(−∞,∞), Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is decreasing in
pu ∈ [−E {φ} ,−φmin]. We omit the details here.
(Step 6) Now we are ready to conclude the proof.
When J ′′ (z) = 0, z ∈ R, based on Step 4 and
Step 5, Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is increasing in pu ∈
[−φmax,−E {φ}] and decreasing in pu ∈ [−E {φ} ,−φmin].
Based on Step 3, p∗u lies in [−φmax,−φmin]. Hence, we have
p∗u = −E {φ}.
Based on Step 4, when J ′′ (z) ≤ 0, z ∈ R,
Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is increasing in
pu ∈ [−φmax,−E {φ}]. Based on Step 3, p∗u lies in
[−φmax,−φmin]. Hence, we have −E {φ} ≤ p∗u ≤ −φmin.
Based on Step 5, when J ′′ (z) ≥ 0, z ∈ R,
Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp
(
H˜ (pu) , pu
) )}
is decreasing in
pu ∈ [−E {φ} ,−φmin]. Based on Step 3, p∗u lies in
[−φmax,−φmin]. Hence, we have −φmax ≤ p∗u ≤ −E {φ}.
Based on Step 1, for any J (·), we have l∗u = H˜ (p∗u).
Note that function H˜ (pu) is decreasing in pu. According to
the relation between p∗u and−E {φ} for J ′′ (z) = 0, J ′′ (z) <
0, and J ′′ (z) > 0, we can easily derive the corresponding
relation between l∗u and H˜ (−E {φ}).
APPENDIX V
MODEL DISCUSSIONS
V.1 Modeling Congestion in General Infrastructure
In this work, we focus on the venue’s investment in app-
related infrastructure, and assume that the infrastructure
(such as Wi-Fi networks and smartphone chargers) is mainly
used by the users interacting with the POI. It is interesting
to study the scenario where the infrastructure is used by all
users visiting the venue and the users who do not interact
with the POI also cause congestion. Next, we briefly discuss
the potential changes in the model and results when we
study this scenario.
First, we need to modify the users’ payoff function in
Eq. (1). The original congestion term is − δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N ,
where y¯ (r, I) is the fraction of users interacting with the
POI. Only the payoffs of the users choosing d = 2 (i.e.,
visiting the venue and interacting with the POI) include
this congestion term. In the modified model, we need to
define a new function, z¯ (r, I), to capture the fraction of
users who visit the venue, and modify the congestion term
as − δI+I0 z¯ (r, I)N . Then, the payoffs of both the users
choosing d = 1 (i.e., visiting the venue without interacting
with the POI) and the users choosing d = 2 will include this
new congestion term.
Second, the results of different decision makers’ strate-
gies will change. Because the congestion term changes from
− δI+I0 y¯ (r, I)N to − δI+I0 z¯ (r, I)N , we need to apply back-
ward induction to analyze the new three-stage game and
derive new results about the app’s, venue’s, and users’
strategies at the equilibrium. Intuitively, since the users
who do not interact with the POI also suffer from the
congestion of using infrastructure, the venue may invest in
the infrastructure even without any payment from the app.
V.2 Modeling Non-Monetary Rewards
In this section, we use an example to briefly discuss the
extension of our framework to a case where the app-venue
collaboration is based on non-monetary rewards.
Suppose that the app does not charge the venue based
on a two-part tariff. Instead, the app displays information
about the venue to the players who use the app at the venue.
For example, when the venue is a restaurant, the app can
display information about the venue’s food recommenda-
tions.
To analyze this app-venue collaboration, we can modify
the venue’s payoff function and the app’s revenue function
as follows:
• We can modify the venue’s payoff function by re-
placing the payment term (i.e., the payment from the
venue to the app) by a new term, which captures
the increase in the venue’s profit due to the app’s
display of the venue’s information. Intuitively, if the
app increases the degree of displaying the venue’s
information, the venue will increase its investment
level on the app-related infrastructure, which enables
more users to use the app.
• When the app increases the degree of displaying the
venue’s information, the app will have less space to
advertise for other advertisers. Hence, we also need
to modify the app’s revenue function by replacing
the venue’s payment term by an ad revenue loss term,
which describes the loss in the ad revenue due to the
display of the venue’s information. In this modified
model, the app’s problem is to determine the degree
of displaying the venue’s information rather than the
lump-sum fee and per-player charge.
We can still apply backward induction to analyze the
multi-stage game and derive the app’s and venue’s optimal
strategies.
APPENDIX W
BARGAINING BETWEEN APP AND VENUE
In Section 4.3, we study the case where the app has the
market power and directly determines the tariff. In this sec-
tion, we consider a bargaining-based negotiation between
the app and venue in Stage I, where the app bargains with
the venue to decide the tariff. We formulate the bargaining
between the app and venue as Problem 5. Note that the bar-
gaining formulation in Stage I does not change the analysis
and results in Stages II and III.
Problem 5. The app and venue determine (l∗b , p
∗
b) by solving
(139)-(141).
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max
(
Rapp (lb, pb)
)γ(
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb)− bηN U
cmax
)1−γ
(139)
s.t. Rapp (lb, pb) ≥ 0,Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) ≥ bηN U
cmax
, (140)
var. lb, pb ∈ R. (141)
When the app and venue cannot reach an agreement on
the tariff, the app will not tag the venue as a POI. In this case,
the app’s revenue is 0, and the venue’s payoff is bηN Ucmax .
As shown in (140), the bargaining solution (lb, pb) ensures
that the app’s revenue and venue’s payoff will be no smaller
than 0 and bηN Ucmax , respectively. Furthermore, the optimal
bargaining solution (l∗b , p
∗
b) maximizes the product between(
Rapp (lb, pb)
)γ
and
(
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb)−
bηN Ucmax
)1−γ
. Here, Rapp (lb, pb) = Rapp (lb, pb) − 0 cap-
tures the difference between the app’s revenue under (lb, pb)
and its revenue when it cannot reach an agreement with
the venue (i.e., 0). Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) −
bηN Ucmax is the difference between the venue’s payoff under
(lb, pb) and its payoff when it cannot reach an agreement
with the app. γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1−γ ∈ [0, 1] represent the app’s
and venue’s bargaining powers, respectively. When γ = 1,
Problem 5 degenerates to Problem 3, where the app has the
market power and directly determines the tariff.
We show the optimal bargaining solution in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. The two-part tariff under the bargaining is
p∗b = −φ, l∗b = γH˜ (−φ) . (142)
Proof. (Step 1) We show that we only need to focus on the
(lb, pb) satisfying r∗ (lb, pb) = 1 to determine the optimal
bargaining solution. For (lb, pb) with r∗ (lb, pb) = 0, we can
see that the corresponding value of the objective function
(139) is zero. When lb = γH˜ (−φ) and pb = −φ, we can see
that r∗ (lb, pb) = 1, and compute the value of the objective
function (139) as γ (1− γ) H˜2 (−φ), which is no less than
zero. Because it is easy to check that lb = γH˜ (−φ) and
pb = −φ satisfy r∗ (lb, pb) = 1, we only need to focus on the
(lb, pb) satisfying r∗ (lb, pb) = 1 to determine the optimal
bargaining solution.
(Step 2) We prove that for any feasible bargaining solu-
tion (lb, pb) with pb 6= −φ and r∗ (lb, pb) = 1, we can always
ensure that p′b = −φ and
l′b =bNx¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
))
− kI∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
+ φNy¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
))
− bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))
+ kI∗ (lb, pb) + pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) + lb (143)
constitute a feasible bargaining solution and achieve at least
the same objective function’s value as pb and lb.
First, we prove r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) = 1. When the venue does
not become a POI under (l′b, p
′
b), it does not invest and has
a payoff of bηN Ucmax . When the venue becomes a POI and
chooses I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
)
as its investment level, its payoff
becomes bNx¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
))
− kI∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
)
−
(
l′b + p
′
bNy¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
)))
. Plugging the expres-
sion of l′b, we can rewrite the venue’s payoff as
bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) − kI∗ (lb, pb) − pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) − lb,
which is the same as the venue’s optimal payoff under
(lb, pb). Note that the venue’s optimal payoff under (lb, pb) is
no less than bηN Ucmax . This implies that under (l
′
b, p
′
b), when
the venue becomes a POI and chooses I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
)
, its
payoff is no less that bηN Ucmax . Recall that bηN
U
cmax
is the
venue’s payoff when it does not become a POI under (l′b, p
′
b).
We can see that the venue should always become a POI
under (l′b, p
′
b), i.e., r
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) = 1.
Second, we prove that Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) ≥ Rapp (lb, pb) ≥ 0.
Note that Rapp (lb, pb) can be written as
Rapp (lb, pb) = lb + (pb + φ)Ny¯ (1, I
∗ (lb, pb)) . (144)
Since (lb, pb) is feasible, Rapp (lb, pb) is no less than 0. Then,
we compute Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) as
Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) = l
′
b + (p
′
b + φ)Ny¯ (1, I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b)) = l
′
b. (145)
According to Propositions 4, 5, and 6, when the venue
becomes a POI, its investment level is not affected by the
lump-sum fee. Since r∗
(
H˜ (−φ) , p′b
)
= r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) = 1,
we have I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
= I∗ (l′b,−φ). Therefore, we can
rewrite l′b in (143) as
l′b =bNx¯ (1, I
∗ (l′b,−φ))− kI∗ (l′b,−φ)
+ φNy¯ (1, I∗ (l′b,−φ))− bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))
+ kI∗ (lb, pb) + pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) + lb. (146)
By plugging the above equation to (145), we have
Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) =lb + bNx¯ (1, I
∗ (l′b,−φ))− kI∗ (l′b,−φ)
+ φNy¯ (1, I∗ (l′b,−φ))− bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))
+ kI∗ (lb, pb) + pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) . (147)
Next, we compare Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) with R
app (lb, pb). We com-
pute Rapp (l′b, p
′
b)−Rapp (lb, pb) as
bNx¯ (1, I∗ (l′b,−φ))− kI∗ (l′b,−φ) + φNy¯ (1, I∗ (l′b,−φ))
− bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) + kI∗ (lb, pb)− φNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb)) .
(148)
Based on r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) = r
∗ (l′b,−φ) = 1 and the definition of
I∗ (l′b,−φ), we have
I∗ (l′b,−φ) = arg max
I≥0
bNx¯ (1, I)− kI + φNy¯ (r, I) . (149)
Hence, (148) is always non-negative. This implies that
Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) ≥ Rapp (lb, pb). Moreover, since Rapp (lb, pb) ≥
0 (according to the feasibility of (lb, pb)), we can see that
Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) ≥ Rapp (lb, pb) ≥ 0.
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Third, we prove Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) =
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) ≥ bηN Ucmax . The expres-
sion of Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) is
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) = bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))
− kI∗ (lb, pb)− (lb + pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))) . (150)
Since (lb, pb) is feasible, the above expression is
no less than bηN Ucmax . Then, the expression of
Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) is
Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) = bNx¯ (1, I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b))
− kI∗ (l′b, p′b)− (l′b + p′bNy¯ (1, I∗ (l′b, p′b))) . (151)
By plugging the expression of l′b in (146) to the above
equation, we have
Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) = bNx¯ (1, I
∗ (lb, pb))
− kI∗ (lb, pb)− (lb + pbNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb, pb))) . (152)
Comparing (152) with (150), we find that
Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) =
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) . (153)
Because Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) ≥ bηN Ucmax ,
we have Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) =
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) ≥ bηN Ucmax .
Fourth, since we have proved the re-
lation Rapp (l′b, p
′
b) ≥ Rapp (lb, pb) and re-
lation Πvenue (r∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , I
∗ (l′b, p
′
b) , l
′
b, p
′
b) =
Πvenue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb), we can easily see
that the value of the objective function (139) under (l′b, p
′
b)
is no less than that under (lb, pb).
(Step 3) Based on the results of Step 1 and Step 2, we
only need to focus on the (lb, pb) satisfying pb = −φ and
r∗ (lb, pb) = 1 to determine the optimal bargaining solution.
When pb = −φ and r∗ (lb, pb) = 1, we can derive the
following relation
Rapp (lb, pb) + Π
venue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) =
bNx¯ (1, I∗ (lb,−φ))− kI∗ (lb,−φ) + φNy¯ (1, I∗ (lb,−φ)) .
(154)
According to Propositions 4, 5, and 6, when the venue
becomes a POI, its investment level is not affected by the
lump-sum fee. Hence, we have the relation I∗ (lb,−φ) =
I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
. Then, we can derive the following equa-
tion from (154):
Rapp (lb, pb) + Π
venue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) =
bNx¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
))
− kI∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
)
+ φNy¯
(
1, I∗
(
H˜ (−φ) ,−φ
))
. (155)
Based on Corollary 1, we can easily verify that the right-
hand side equals H˜ (−φ)+bηN Ucmax . That is to say, we have
Rapp (lb, pb) + Π
venue (r∗ (lb, pb) , I∗ (lb, pb) , lb, pb) =
H˜ (−φ) + bηN U
cmax
. (156)
Note that when pb = −φ, the app’s revenue Rapp (lb, pb) =
lb. Then, we can rewrite problem (139)-(141) as
max lγb
(
H˜ (−φ)− lb
)1−γ
(157)
var. 0 ≤ lb ≤ H˜ (−φ) . (158)
The objective function (157) is concave, and we can easily
obtain the optimal solution l∗b = γH˜ (−φ) by examining the
first-order derivative of the objective function.
According to the three steps, we can see that p∗b = −φ
and l∗b = γH˜ (−φ).
APPENDIX X
INFLUENCES OF η AND N IN SPECIAL CASES
X.1 Influence of η When φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ2
In this section, we numerically show that when φ < bV /U
and δ ≤ δ2, Rapp (l∗, p∗) may decrease with η. We choose
N = 200, cmax = 36, U = 6, V = 5, I0 = 25, k = 3, b = 7,
θ = 0.05, φ = 2, and δ = 9. Based on the definition of δ2 in
Lemma 2, we can compute δ2 = 12.09. Hence, we can verify
that both φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ2 hold under the parameter
setting.
We change η from 0.01 to 1, and plotRapp (l∗, p∗) against
η in Fig. 15. We can see that Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases with η
when η ∈ (0.34, 0.49) and does not change with η when
η ∈ (0.49, 1). This numerical result is consistent with our
conclusion in Table 1, i.e., if the unit advertising revenue φ
is small, the app may avoid collaborating with a popular
venue.
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Fig. 15: Impact of η on Rapp (l∗, p∗) When φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ2.
X.2 Influence of N When φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ3
In this section, we numerically show that when φ < bV /U
and δ ≤ δ3, Rapp (l∗, p∗) may decrease with N . We choose
cmax = 100, U = 6, V = 5, I0 = 3, k = 5.2, b = 29, η = 0.3,
θ = 0.1, φ = 8, and δ = 12. Based on the definition of δ3 in
Lemma 3, we can compute δ3 = 12.40. Hence, we can verify
that both φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ3 hold under the parameter
setting.
We change N from 10 to 150, and plot Rapp (l∗, p∗)
against N in Fig. 16. We can see that Rapp (l∗, p∗) decreases
with N when N ∈ (45, 75) and does not change with N
whenN ∈ (75, 150). This numerical result is consistent with
our conclusion in Table 1, i.e., if the unit advertising revenue
φ is small, the app may avoid collaborating with a venue in
a busy area.
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Fig. 16: Impact of N on Rapp (l∗, p∗) When φ < bV /U and δ ≤ δ3.
APPENDIX Y
NUMERICAL COMPUTATION OF p∗u AND l∗u AND IM-
PACT OF APP’S RISK PREFERENCE
First, we briefly discuss the numerical approach to com-
pute p∗u and l
∗
u for the risk-averse and risk-seeking apps
(shown in the second and third bullets of Theorem 3). From
Theorem 3, the optimal tariff (l∗u, p
∗
u) satisfies the relation
l∗u = H˜ (p
∗
u). Hence, we can substitute lu = H˜ (pu) into
the objective function in (22) to obtain a new objective
function, which is only a function of pu. Then, we can
numerically show that the new objective function is always
strictly unimodal in pu when pu is below a specific thresh-
old, and is a constant function otherwise. In this case, we
can directly compute p∗u via the Golden Section method.
The computational complexity is O
(
log 1
)
, where  > 0
captures the accuracy of the solution, i.e., the gap between
the computed price and the optimal price is upper bounded
by . After obtaining p∗u, we can use the relation l
∗
u = H˜ (p
∗
u)
to compute l∗u.
Second, we investigate the impact of the degree of
app’s risk aversion on the p∗u, l
∗
u, and Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp (l∗u, p
∗
u)
)}
through numerical experiments. We choose N = 100,
cmax = 25, U = 4, V = 5, I0 = 0.1, k = 3, b = 0.5,
η = 0.1, θ = 0.05, and δ = 0.3. Moreover, we assume that
φ follows a uniform distribution, i.e., φ ∼ U [φmin, φmax].
We fix φmax+φmin2 = 0.2, and vary
φmax−φmin
2 from 0 to 0.18.
The value of φmax−φmin2 reflects the randomness of φ. We
consider the following utility function for the app:
J (z) = 2− e−αz, z ∈ (−∞,∞) , (159)
which is a concave function. Note that parameter α > 0 de-
scribes the degree of risk aversion of the app server. The con-
stant 2 does not affect the results’ insights, and simply en-
sures that the app’s expected utility Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp (l∗u, p
∗
u)
)}
is always positive.
We show the app’s expected utility and optimal tariff
under different φmax−φmin2 and α in Fig. 17(a), Fig. 17(b),
and Fig. 17(c). Because φmax−φmin2 reflects the randomness
of φ, and α describes the degree of risk aversion, we have
the following observations.
Observation 2. If the app is risk-averse, the per-player charge p∗u
is increasing in the randomness of φ. Moreover, p∗u is increasing
in the degree of risk aversion.
Observation 3. If the app is risk-averse, the lump-sum fee l∗u is
decreasing in the randomness of φ. Moreover, l∗u is decreasing in
the degree of risk aversion.
Observation 4. If the app is risk-averse, its expected utility is
decreasing in the randomness of φ.
Third, we investigate the impact of the degree of app’s
seeking risk on the p∗u, l
∗
u, and Eφ
{
J
(
Rapp (l∗u, p
∗
u)
)}
through numerical experiments. The results are basically
opposite to the results for a risk-averse app. In order to
model a risk-seeking app, we consider the following utility
function for the app:
J (z) = eβz, z ∈ (−∞,∞) , (160)
which is a convex function. Parameter β describes the app’s
degree of seeking risk. The remaining parameter settings are
the same as the risk-averse app case.
We show the app’s expected utility and optimal tariff
under different φmax−φmin2 and β in Fig. 18(a), Fig. 18(b), and
Fig. 18(c). Because φmax−φmin2 reflects the randomness of φ,
and β describes the app’s degree of seeking risk, we have
the following observations.
Observation 5. If the app is risk-seeking, the per-player charge
p∗u is decreasing in the randomness of φ. Moreover, p
∗
u is decreas-
ing in the degree of seeking risk.
Observation 6. If the app is risk-seeking, the lump-sum fee l∗u is
increasing in the randomness of φ. Moreover, l∗u is increasing in
the degree of seeking risk.
Observation 7. If the app is risk-seeking, the its expected utility
is increasing in the randomness of φ.
APPENDIX Z
MORE NUMERICAL RESULTS
Z.1 Impact of δ
In this section, we provide more numerical results about
the impact of δ. We consider the following three parameter
settings:
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 3, V = 5, I0 = 0.2, k = 2,
b = 1, η = 0.2, θ = 0.05, and φ = 0.4;
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 2, V = 5, I0 = 0.6, k = 3,
b = 1, η = 0.3, θ = 0.05, and φ = 0.6;
• N = 200, cmax = 22, U = 3, V = 3, I0 = 0.6, k = 3,
b = 2, η = 0.2, θ = 0.05, and φ = 0.6.
We show the corresponding numerical results in Fig. 19(a),
Fig. 19(b), and Fig. 19(c). We can see that the key insight
still holds: if the congestion effect factor is medium, our tariff
significantly outperforms the lump-sum-only tariff.
Z.2 Impact of θ
In this section, we provide more numerical results about
the impact of θ. We consider the following three parameter
settings:
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 3, V = 5, I0 = 0.2, k = 2,
b = 1, η = 0.2, φ = 0.4, and δ = 0.2;
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 2, V = 5, I0 = 0.2, k = 3,
b = 1, η = 0.3, φ = 0.6, and δ = 0.2;
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(a) Per-Player Charge p∗u.
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(b) Lump-Sum Fee l∗u.
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(c) App’s Expected Utility.
Fig. 17: Risk-Averse App.
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(c) App’s Expected Utility.
Fig. 18: Risk-Seeking App.
• N = 200, cmax = 26, U = 3, V = 3, I0 = 0.2, k = 3,
b = 2, η = 0.2, φ = 0.6, and δ = 0.2.
We show the corresponding numerical results in Fig. 20(a),
Fig. 20(b), and Fig. 20(c). We can see that the key insight still
holds: if the network effect factor is large, our tariff significantly
outperforms the per-player-only tariff.
Z.3 Impact of φ
In this section, we provide more numerical results about
the impact of φ. We consider the following three parameter
settings:
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 3, V = 5, I0 = 0.2, k = 2,
b = 1, η = 0.2, θ = 0.05, and δ = 0.2;
• N = 200, cmax = 24, U = 2, V = 5, I0 = 0.2, k = 3,
b = 1, η = 0.3, θ = 0.05, and δ = 0.2;
• N = 200, cmax = 26, U = 3, V = 3, I0 = 0.2, k = 3,
b = 2, η = 0.2, θ = 0.05, and δ = 0.2.
We show the corresponding numerical results in Fig. 21(a),
Fig. 21(b), and Fig. 21(c). We can see that the key insight
still holds: if the unit ad revenue is large, our tariff significantly
outperforms the per-player-only tariff and lump-sum-only tariff.
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Fig. 19: Comparison Under Different δ.
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Fig. 20: Comparison Under Different θ.
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Fig. 21: Comparison Under Different φ.
